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The Life (and Death?) of Corporate
Waste
Harwell Wells*
Abstract
At first glance, corporate waste makes no sense. The very
definition of waste—a transaction so one-sided that no reasonable
business person would enter into it, an act equivalent to gift or
“spoliation”—suggests that it would never occur, for what
corporation would ever enter into a transaction so absurd? Yet
waste claims are regularly made against corporate managers.
Respected judges have downplayed waste as a “vestige” and
described it as “possibly non-existent,” the Loch Ness monster of
corporate law; but waste survives. It is a remnant of ultra vires, a
doctrine proclaimed largely dead for the last hundred years—but
waste is not dead. It confounds our model of managerial
responsibility; after decades in which corporate directors’ and
officers’ duties have been focused into the fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, waste sits outside that framework, for historically
waste isn’t a fiduciary duty at all. This Article, the first modern
survey of the corporate waste doctrine, discusses the origin of
corporate waste, documents and explains its survival, and
tentatively foresees its demise.
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I. Introduction: Waste’s Confusions
At first glance, corporate waste makes no sense. The classic
definition of waste1—a transaction in which “what the
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person
of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what
the corporation has paid,”2 an act equivalent to “gift” or
“spoliation” of corporate assets—suggests that waste should
never arise, for what corporation would ever enter into a
transaction so absurd?3 Yet waste claims are regularly made. The
conventional wisdom is that waste claims never succeed;4 but
1. In this Article I usually refer to “corporate waste” as simply “waste.”
Other bodies of law, notably property, have their own waste doctrines, which are
unconnected to corporate waste. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY
329, 432 (3d ed. 2010) (overviewing property law and the distinct waste doctrine
in that area of the law). While this Article focuses on waste in corporations,
waste can also be found in other business entities. See Trover v. 419 OCR Inc.,
397 Ill. App. 3d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2010) (discussing waste in LLCs);
Williams v. Habul, 219 N.C. App. 281, 283 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a
corporate waste claim, among others, brought by an LLC owner against a
second owner in the same LLC); Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2010 Amendments to
Kentucky’s Business Entity Laws, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 383, 413 n.245 (2011) (“While
typically seen in the context of corporations, waste can also occur (and is equally
actionable) in the context of a partnership.”).
2. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
3. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952).
4. See, e.g., Rudolf Koch & Christopher Lyons, Delaware Insider: Executive
Compensation Lessons from Freedman v. Adams, BUS. LAW. TODAY (March
2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/03/delaware_insider.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Traditional compensation claims, alleging that
particular compensation were excessive and thereby constituted corporate
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empirical studies show that at some stages of litigation they do,5
and some of the most significant corporate law cases of the last
decade have dealt with corporate waste.6 Respected judges have
called for sharply limiting it, referring to it as a “vestige”7 and
deriding it as the mythical “Loch Ness Monster” of corporate law;
still, waste survives.8 It is a remnant of ultra vires, a doctrine
proclaimed dead for the last hundred years—but waste is not
dead.9 It confounds our model of managerial responsibility; after
decades in which discussion of directors’ and officers’ duties have
focused on the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, waste still sits
outside that framework, for waste until now has not been seen as
an aspect of fiduciary duties at all.10
waste, have not fared well under Delaware law. Most fail the rigors of Rule 23.1
and are dismissed at the pleading stage.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
5. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569,
573–85 (2001) (documenting survival of waste claims at various stages of
litigation).
6. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–75
(Del. 2006) (concluding that payment of a severance package did not amount to
waste); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135–40
(Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that shareholders were unable to show that demand
was futile on waste claims relating to a stock repurchase program).
7. Harbor Fin. Partners v Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 882 (Del.Ch. 1999).
8. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del.Ch. 1997) (reviewing
the Plaintiff’s assertion that he has pleaded cognizable claims of waste).
9. On other surviving remnants of ultra vires, see, for example, STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 30–33 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining MBCA
§ 3.04(b)’s three “limited exceptions under which the ultra vires doctrine has
some lingering validity”); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder
Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could
Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1314–51 (2000)
(determining that illegal activities and the non-profit sector serve as a place for
the “surviving vestige of ultra vires doctrine”).
10. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 35 (describing the distinct concepts
of fiduciary breach and committing waste). On recent developments in Delaware
fiduciary law, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin
Belotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673–90 (2010) (describing the “rise
and fall” of certain fiduciary concepts and their implications moving forward);
Robert Thompson, The Short, but Interesting Life of Good Faith as an
Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010) (examining
“why good faith gained such added prominence during [the] recent period and
what its eclipse tells us about the evolution” of fiduciary duty law”).
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This Article is the first modern study thoroughly canvassing
waste—its origins, growth, present role, and future prospects.11 It
proceeds as follows. Part II tracks the prehistory of waste in the
ultra vires doctrine—the now largely discarded set of rules that
barred corporations from acting for purposes not spelled out in
their corporate charters—focusing particularly on the strand of
ultra vires eventually reworked as waste, the ban on gifts by a
corporation.12 Part III demonstrates how this ban on gifts was,
starting in the 1930s, reworked into the modern doctrine of
corporate waste in a series of cases, which sought to rein in
executive compensation and police the growth of new methods for
compensating corporate executives.13 There is a reason waste
appeared at this time, when limits on corporate activity were
11. Other modern articles have looked at waste in particular contexts. See,
e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or
Self-Dealing?, 79 MO. L. REV. 283, 303–10 (2014) [hereinafter Leahy, Super PAC]
(examining different approaches to corporate waste and concluding that a
shareholder lawsuit challenging a typical Super PAC contribution is unlikely to
succeed on a theory of waste); John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in
Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W.
VA. L. REV. 433, 453–57 (2005) (concluding that Delaware “has failed to apply
the traditional doctrine of waste” in recent decisions); William A. Nelson, II,
Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims of Corporate Waste
to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134,
138–39 (2012) [hereinafter Nelson II, Post-Citizens United] (introducing the
history and evolution of waste case law in Delaware). Several very good student
Notes have also been written on the topic. See Steven C. Caywood, Note,
Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable
Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 135 (2010) (concluding that a “revitalized corporate waste doctrine would
allow shareholders to have some meaningful power as a safeguard against a
board of directors that excessively compensates executives”); Charles Gass,
Note, Outer Limits: Fiduciary Duties and the Doctrine of Waste, 92 DENV. U. L.
REV. ONLINE 93, 104 (2015) (surveying waste doctrine’s application under
Delaware Law and through an empirical analysis determined that waste claims
are “infrequent”); Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of
Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste,
26 J. CORP. L. 145, 146 (2000) (determining the proper standard of waste in
Delaware and addressing whether current treatment of corporate waste in the
Court of Chancery is proper); Jamie L. Kastler, Note, The Problem with Waste:
Delaware’s Lenient Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of
Derivative Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2011) (arguing that Delaware
courts should explicitly place waste under the obligation of good faith).
12. Infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III (outlining waste’s emergence in the compensation,
charitable gift, and political donation contexts).
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eroding but courts’ need to investigate and cast light on
questionable corporate decisions was not. Waste would be the
first of a series of “equitable safety valves”—what Robert
Thompson has dubbed judicial “fail-safe devices”—allowing courts
to scrutinize and second-guess corporate decisions that did not
clearly violate fiduciary duties, but also made little sense as the
products of careful business judgment.14 This Part also shows
how
waste,
once
developed,
was
deployed—largely
unsuccessfully—to challenge other novel corporate expenditures,
notably charitable and political donations.15 Part IV follows
waste’s oscillating fortunes into the first decade of the
twenty-first century.16 Courts were rarely comfortable with
waste’s ill-defined scope, letting it languish for decades, and even
calling for its limitation or revision in the 1990s. Yet waste also
had its uses, and occasionally found favor in courts’ eyes, notably
in the landmark Disney litigation.17 Part V moves toward the
present day, observing that waste is losing its independent
existence as courts have found in the revivified duty of good faith
both an alternative doctrinal safety valve for questioning
corporate decisions and a means to transplant waste into the
modern framework of corporate fiduciary duties.18
II. Waste’s Origins
Waste has its roots in ultra vires,19 the doctrine flourishing in
the nineteenth century, which held that directors had no power to
14. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895 (Del. Ch.
1999) (describing corporate waste and the continued utility of an “equitable
safety valve”). See generally THOMPSON, infra note 28. Thompson’s influence on
this Article should be clear.
15. Infra notes 135–142.
16. Infra Part IV.
17. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006)
(discussing a shareholder suit questioning the Disney board’s decisions with
respect to the firm’s number-two officer and his proposed generous termination
benefits).
18. Infra Part V.
19. As recognized, e.g., both by scholars, see ERIC CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 385 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that waste is a
remnant of the ultra vires doctrine) and courts, see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d
327, 335–36 (Del. Ch. 1997) (linking waste to ultra vires).
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“perform[] acts outside the corporation’s authority” as spelled out
in its charter or general law.20 Ultra vires embodied the
nineteenth century’s belief that the corporation was a creation of
the state, possessing only such powers provided by the state in its
charter, and constantly threatening to exceed its bounds.21 Ultra
vires acts were those “not merely irregular in form or done by
unauthorized organs, but acts which the corporation could not
legally do in any manner without having first changed its
constitution.”22 The doctrine was well-established by 1855, when
the U.S. Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey23 held that courts
have “jurisdiction over corporations, . . . to restrain those who
administer them from doing acts which would amount to a
violation of charters.”24 While ultra vires’s main justification was
in protecting society from corporations’ potentially overweening
power, it also served to protect shareholders from corporate
controllers’ departure from the corporation’s limited scope.25 In an
era lacking many modern checks on managerial discretion such
as mandatory disclosure or efficient capital markets, ultra vires
was another means to discipline agents and, together with the
fiduciary constraints on negligence, fraud, and self-dealing, was a
major guarantor of faithful corporate governance.26
20. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS §§ 36 (1897). On
the history of ultra vires, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 77–79 (1992) (describing ultra vires doctrine’s
treatment during the period of 1870–1960); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 59–64 (1991) (discussing its history in the
section on “Classicism and Ultra Vires”); Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1302–14
(explaining the history of ultra vires through a “rise and fall” narrative).
21. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 67 (1927)
[hereinafter BALLENTINE 1927] (describing the basis of the ultra vires doctrine);
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 212, 218–19
(1990) (connecting ultra vires to artificial entity theory of the corporation).
22. FREUND, supra note 20, at 62.
23. 59 U.S. 331 (1855).
24. Id. at 341.
25. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 20, at 62 (“[An ultra vires] act may
constitute a violation . . . in two different directions; as against the associates
who do not concur in it is a breach of contract or trust; as against the state it is a
breach of a limitation imposed upon the body corporate . . . .”).
26. See Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1304–07 (noting the surviving
remnants of ultra vires, on which modern waste law is based). On fiduciary
duties in the nineteenth century, see, e.g., JOSEPH KINNICUT ANGELL, SAMUEL
AMES & JOHN LATHOP, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

CORPORATE WASTE

1245

Ultra vires was a more inflexible curb on a corporation’s
managers than were fiduciary duties. While the fiduciary duties
tested whether managers used their powers carefully and loyally,
ultra vires asked whether they possessed power to act at all.
Under ultra vires, directors and officers who acted beyond the
corporation’s powers were liable—perhaps absolutely—for such
acts.27 According to a leading treatise, Thompson on
Corporations,28 unlike with fiduciary duty analysis, liability for
an ultra vires act did not generally turn on intent or state of
mind:
The rule is that if directors of a limited company apply the
money of the company for purposes so outside its power that
the company could not sanction such application, they may be
made personally liable as for a breach of trust; but if they
apply the money of the company, or exercise any of its powers,
in a manner which is not ultra vires, then a strong and clear
case of malfeasance must be made out to render them liable
for a loss thereby occasioned to the corporation.29

Fletcher on Corporations30 made a similar point; for a court “to
enjoin ultra vires acts . . . it is not necessary that there shall be
AGGREGATE 325 (9th ed. 1871) (noting that directors can be called to account if
they “made themselves answerable by their negligence or fraud”).
27. If an ultra vires act was not yet executory, shareholders could seek an
injunction preventing it and in extreme situations the state could seek a quo
warranto proceeding to revoke the corporate charter. See GEORGE WASHINGTON
FIELD, THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES: ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED BY SELECTED
CASES, CLASSIFIED AND FULLY ANNOTATED 229 (1881) (“The general rule is that if
a corporation is about to engage in an enterprise not authorized by the charter
or [lacking in the corporate provisions,] a court of equity will, by injunction,
restrain such acts . . . for the protection of the rights of stockholders.”); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 58–64 (discussing ultra vires).
28. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (1908); see also Sheldon v. Bills, 166 N.W. 117, 117 (Neb. 1918)
(noting that directors who expend a sum “for a purpose beyond their powers as
directors . . . will be personally liable for the loss” and that directors’ “honest
belief at the time that such action [would] result in such benefit to the company
will not relieve them from liability”). But see Spering’s Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24
(1872) (stating that directors may not be liable for ultra vires action in a case
where the corporation’s charter was so complicated that even with due care they
could have made a mistake regarding it).
29.
30.

THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 300.
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS (1919) [hereinafter FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS].
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any intentional wrong or actual fraud on the part of the officers
or other stockholders. It is enough that the act be ultra vires.”31
The rigidity of ultra vires’s limits also helps explain a feature
that would survive into waste; a majority of shareholders could
not ratify ultra vires acts in the face of a single shareholder’s
dissent, even though a majority did have the power to ratify other
acts that may have exceeded a corporate agent’s express
authority.32 In a typical ratification, a principal is asked to affirm
a transaction that it had the power to enter into, the problem
being that the particular agent lacked authority to commit the
principal to it.33 In ultra vires situations, in contrast, the
corporation itself lacked power to enter into the transaction.34
Ultra vires was an often-litigated and befuddling topic;
according to one authority, there was “perhaps no part of the law
concerning corporations in which we meet with so much
difficulty, confusion, and conflict of opinion.”35 During the
doctrine’s heyday, when corporations had narrow and specific
purposes, courts frequently found themselves finely parsing
charter provisions to determine whether the power to perform a
particular act could be discerned in a corporation’s enumerated
31. Id. § 4062.
32. See, e.g., Endicott v. Marvel, 87 A. 230, 233 (N.J. Ch. 1913) (“The
transactions of a board which cannot be sustained against the will of a single
stockholder . . . are acts which are either ultra vires, fraudulent, or illegal.”);
FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, § 4062 (“[A]ny misapplication or
diversion of assets to purposes not authorized by its charter, even though all
other stockholders may consent, is a breach of trust toward a dissenting
stockholder.”).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(defining ratification). “Ratification” is also a technical term under Delaware
corporation law used at times in a different sense. See Corwin v. KKR Fin.
Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 309–11 (Del. 2015) (“Instead, the Chancellor read
Gantler as a decision solely intended to clarify the meaning of the precise term
‘ratification.’”); J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on
Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1446, 1480–91 (2014) (“Vice
Chancellor Jacobs . . . argued for the need to distinguish between (1) ratification
in its ‘“classic” or paradigmatic form,’ . . . and (2) ‘the effect of an informed
shareholder vote that was statutorily required for the transaction to have legal
existence.’”).
34. See City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 577 F. Supp. 2d
124, 134 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing ultra vires as “lack of capacity”).
35. See BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, § 67 (noting the immensely
complicated and inconsistent application of ultra vires law).
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purposes; cases examined whether, for instance, a railroad
company could pay for improvements on a resort hotel located on
the railroad’s line,36 or whether a company chartered to
manufacture musical instruments could guarantee the expenses
of a musical festival that would increase the manufacturer’s
sales.37
A few acts, however, were held to be ultra vires for any
corporation.38 Most important for this Article, gifts—donations for
which the corporation would receive nothing in return—were
invariably ultra vires. According to Morawetz on Corporations,39
the “property and funds of a corporation . . . cannot be devoted to
any use which is not in accordance with their chartered purposes,
except by unanimous consent. No agent of a corporation has
implied authority to give away any portion of the corporate
property . . . gratuitously.”40 Forty years later Ballantine on
Corporations41 reported the same limit, with the same
explanation: “[A] gift of its property by a corporation not created
for charitable purposes is in violation of the rights of the
stockholders and is ultra vires[.]”42
While gifts were a distinct category of ultra vires acts,
corporate waste was not. As a distinct doctrine and cause of
action, corporate waste did not yet exist. Nineteenth century
cases certainly refer to “waste,” but the term characterized the
result of a range of disfavored actions and could be the result of

36. See W. Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 62 A. 351, 357 (Md. 1905)
(concluding that the “hotel company has paid nothing and parted with nothing
under this contract, and is therefore, under all the authorities, without any
right of action”).
37. See Davis v. Old Colony R.R. Co., 131 Mass. 258, 258–59 (1881) (finding
that the agreement is ultra vires, and therefore no action can be maintained
upon it against either defendant).
38. See, e.g., FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, § 3424 (noting
that torts and crimes are always ultra vires).
39. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1886).
40. Id. at 399. Authorities were divided on whether an apparent gift that
was “really for the benefit of the corporate enterprise,” and so not truly
gratuitous, was ultra vires. Id. at 424.
41. BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21.
42. Id. at 207–08.
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either a violation of fiduciary duties or an ultra vires act.43 For
example, in 1832 Robinson v. Smith,44 one of the first American
cases dealing with directors’ fiduciary duties, New York’s
Chancellor held that,
[directors of a] joint-stock corporation, who willfully abuse
their trust or misapply the funds of the company, by which a
loss is sustained, are personally liable as trustees to make
good their loss. And they are equally liable, if they suffer the
corporate funds or property to be lost or wasted by gross
negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust. 45

In the 1847 Massachusetts case Smith v. Hurd,46 “waste”
similarly described the result of a violation of fiduciary duties;
according to Chief Justice Shaw, the case concerned “various acts
of negligence and malfeasance . . . in consequence of which . . . the
whole capital of [a] bank was wasted and lost.”47 That said, the
term certainly could also characterize the result of ultra vires
acts. In Gilbert v. Finch,48 a 1903 Massachusetts case, the
directors of an insurance company used company funds to
purchase control of another insurance company in violation of the
first company’s charter.49 The court found that the directors had
acted in good faith, but their transaction still “was ultra vires,
and constituted a waste of the funds” of the company.50 Only in
the twentieth century would “waste” take on a distinctive
meaning in corporation law.
43. See Rabe v. Dunlap, 25 A. 959, 961 (N.J. Ch. 1893) (“A corporation holds
its property as the trustee of its stockholders, and they, like any other cestui que
trust, have a right to have the trust property judiciously and honestly managed,
and preserved from waste and misappropriation.”).
44. 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
45. Id. at 231.
46. 53 Mass. 371 (1847).
47. Id. at 383; accord ANGELL, AMES & LATHROP, supra note 26, at 325
(discussing “waste or misapplication of the corporate funds” in a section
discussing officers’ duties and obligations); see also THOMPSON, supra note 28, at
278 (“Directors are held personally liable for suffering the corporate funds or
property to be wasted or lost by gross negligence or inattention to their duties.”).
48. 66 N.E. 133 (N.Y. 1903).
49. See id. at 133 (noting that the directors took $35,000 from the company
and purchased the new insurance companies with the money).
50. Id. at 134; accord THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 300 (“Directors may be
personally liable where they engage in a business not within the corporate
powers, and thereby waste or lose the corporate assets.”).
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III. Waste’s Emergence
Waste did not emerge until the twentieth century, but ultra
vires had largely disappeared by the end of the nineteenth.51 It
was a doctrine for an economic world where corporations were
creations of the state, strictly limited to a few purposes, and
mistrusted. By early in the twentieth century, however,
Americans were becoming more comfortable with corporations,
coming to view them not as threatening monoliths wielding
special powers but as merely another form in which to conduct
business.52 Limits on corporate purpose rapidly eroded, and it
soon became possible to charter a corporation “for any lawful
business purpose.”53 By the 1920s ultra vires mostly lingered as a
dubious mechanism by which some corporations attempted to
“evade liability upon an irksome contract, by showing [their]
incapacity to make the contract.”54 Yet while the broader
51. See HORWITZ, supra note 20, at 78 (“Even within the last remaining
bastion of the ultra vires rule, the law of contracts, courts after the Civil War
had begun a retreat.”).
52. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 89–91 (1990) (noting the
increased acceptance of the corporation as a natural rather than artificial
entity). This is not to say that opposition to the giant corporation ever
completely disappeared.
53. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business
Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1936) (noting new
business corporations acts allowing for the formation of corporations for any
lawful purpose); Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern
Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 317–18 (1937) (“All of the new
statutes seem to abandon the old attempt at enumeration of specific types of
businesses open to incorporation.” (quotation at 317)). Intriguingly, it may be
that restrictive purpose clauses are making a comeback in limited liability
companies, leading one to wonder whether litigation over LLC purpose can be
far behind. See Suren Gomtsian, Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protection
in Non-Listed Limited Liability Companies, 60 VILL. L. REV. 955, 984 (2016)
(stating that these company-purpose limitation clauses were used to reduce the
discretion of the management); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract
Around Default Statutory Provisions?, 42 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing how LLCs maneuver around default provisions through operating
agreements). My thanks to Professor Mohsen Manesh for this information.
54. See BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, at 235 (achieving this by
extending the doctrine to relations with third parties). The prevailing view of
ultra vires by the 1920s is shown by the header to Ballantine’s discussion:
“Basis of the doctrine of ultra vires—The defense of ultra vires is frequently not
meritorious.” Id. at 234. Ultra vires has survived in nonprofit law. See Henry
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strictures of ultra vires disappeared, the prohibition on gifts by
corporations persisted, and would in the 1930s be seized upon
and reworked by courts and litigants into the doctrine of
corporate waste. The rest of this Part will look at the
development of corporate waste from the 1930s to the 1950s,
particularly in an area where many of the most important
decisions occurred: executive compensation. It will then more
briefly examine two other areas where waste was repeatedly
invoked, the laws of charitable gifts and political donations.55
A. Compensation
Most of the waste doctrine’s development and elaboration
would come in a series of challenges to executive compensation.56
Even before this, though, ultra vires’s ban on gifts had been
applied to some forms of officer and director compensation.
Corporations could not, for example, decide after the fact to
compensate officers or directors for past services:
When an officer is not impliedly entitled to compensation for
services, a vote or other promise by the directors or
stockholders to pay him therefor given after the services have
been performed, is not only without consideration, and void as
a promise on that ground, but is also ultra vires, as a
misapplication of the corporate funds.57

Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 990 (2014)
(stating that the use of ultra vires has continued to exist but in a weakened form
in the context of nonprofit corporations); see also infra notes 165–169 and
accompanying text (discussing corporate waste).
55. See infra Sections III.B–C (outlining statutes and case law present in
both areas of charitable gifts and political donations where waste was invoked).
56. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 585 (1933) (filing a claim to
dispute the validity of an agreement between stockholders and the vice
president and president to pay the officers large amounts of money in addition
to their salaries); McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 883–84
(4th Cir. 1940) (stating that courts ordinarily will not review directors’ decisions
to fix salaries except when the directors improperly elect to give themselves
excessive salaries).
57. BALLANTINE 1927, supra note 21, at 410. This doctrine did not apply
“under such circumstances as to raise an implied promise.” Id.
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There was also some language in treatises that suggests that
excessive compensation could be treated as a gift. Fletcher on
Corporations reported that “in the case of exorbitant and
unreasonable salaries, the court may, on the petition of the
minority stockholders, enjoin the payment of such salaries.”58 It is
unclear whether this targeted compensation that involved
self-dealing by corporate controllers, as hinted by the reference to
“minority stockholders,” or all compensation, but the idea could
clearly be stretched in the latter direction.59
The doctrine of corporate waste “[was] nurtured, if not
spawned”60 in the classic case of Rogers v Hill,61 a challenge to
compensation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1933.62
Before discussing that case, though, we should ask why courts
developed corporate waste as a distinct doctrine in the 1930s. By
the 1920s, ultra vires had almost completely disappeared, along
with rigid corporate codes and narrow corporate purpose
provisions in corporate charters.63 Fiduciary duties still
functioned to limit managerial malfeasance, but they were most
effective at blocking self-dealing.64 Other familiar tools for
checking managers and protecting shareholders, such as the
market for corporate control and robust disclosure requirements,
did not yet exist to any great degree. Managerial power and
overreach enabled by increasingly dispersed shareholding were,
58. FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 4038; see also THOMPSON
supra note 28, at 848 (“[E]xcessive and extravagant salaries to officers must be
viewed in the light of a waste of corporate assets.”).
59. FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 4038 (citing Mathews v.
Headley Chocolate Co., 100 A. 645 (Md. 1917)).
60. Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for
Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209, 210 n.7 (2000).
61. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
62. Id. I discuss this case in Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth
$1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America,
44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 724–37 (2010), from which the discussion of Hill and its
progeny is drawn.
63. See 1 W. COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A
CAPITAL STOCK, vii–viii (4th ed., Callaghan 1898) (“The doctrine of ultra vires is
disappearing.”).
64. See, e.g., In re Allen-Foster-Willett Co., 116 N.E. 875, 876 (Mass. 1917)
(“Obviously, Allen, while a director of the company charged with the duty of
conserving its monetary welfare for the benefit of all concerned, could not
lawfully buy at a discount claims against it.”).

1252

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239 2017)

however, becoming public issues—as shown by the popularity of
William Z. Ripley’s 1927 exposé Main Street and Wall Street65
and then Adolf Berle & Gardiner Means’s 1932 The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.66 The Great Depression only
heightened hostility to corporations and corporate management.67
Given all this, we should not be surprised that in the 1930s
courts were motivated to seek additional tools to police corporate
activity, and to find in waste a “fail-safe doctrine[] to enable
courts to review director conduct that seem[ed] to satisfy
traditional standards used to test director behavior, but where
the decision simply [didn’t] make sense.”68
Rogers was a challenge to a bonus plan at American
Tobacco.69 The plan resulted from a corporate bylaw adopted in
1912 allocating 10% of the firm’s net profits above a fixed amount
to its six senior executives.70 By 1930 the payments were, by
contemporary standards, huge. For example, American Tobacco’s
president received a $168,000 salary and an $842,507 bonus that
year.71 News of this and similar payments at other firms sparked
public outrage and a series of lawsuits.72 In Rogers, shareholders
attacked the payments under several theories, losing at the
Second Circuit before winning in front of the Supreme Court.73
Their challenges turned on both technicalities of corporate law
(for example, whether the bylaw was properly adopted) and more
65.
66.

WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
67. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation:
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1023
(stating that due to the Great Depression “corporations cut wages, reduced
production, and laid off workers”).
68. Thompson, supra note 10, at 544.
69. See Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1932) (stating that a
shareholder sought to invalidate the by-laws of the American Tobacco
Company).
70. See id. (seeking to invalidate Article XII of the bylaws). The bonus was
10% of profits above $8,222,245, which was the profit earned by American
Tobacco in 1912; in 1930, the firm’s profits exceeded $20,000,000. Id. at 113.
71. Id. at 114 (Swan, J., dissenting).
72. See Wells, supra note 62, at 709–13 (discussing such lawsuits).
73. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 585 (1933) (“Plaintiff maintains that
the by-law is invalid and that, even if valid, the amounts paid under it are
unreasonably large and therefore subject to revision by the courts.”).
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general assertions that the payments were inequitable; but the
latter was a difficult case to make. The bonuses were not per se
illegal under corporate law, nor the product of self-dealing (the
bylaw had been adopted well before any of the recipients joined
the company), and there was, the court concluded, no “inference
of actual or constructive fraud.”74 Despite this, the Supreme
Court held that the bonuses could be challenged in court; “the
payments under the by-law,” it held, had “become so large as to
warrant investigation in equity.”75 Quoting a dissent from the
lower court, it stated “the applicable rule: ‘If a bonus payment has
no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in
reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power
to give away corporate property against the protest of the
minority.’”76
This statement summarizes corporate waste in its modern
form: a transaction in which a corporation has received
something that has “no relation to the value . . . for which it is
given,” a “gift in part,” one forbidden by the well-established
principle that corporations cannot make gifts.77 Though clearly
drawing on ultra vires, Rogers announced a new rule, seemingly
rooted in equity, prohibiting not only corporate transactions in
which there is no consideration at all—gifts—but transactions in
which there was no substantial connection between what the
corporation gave and what it received.78 Applying this rule,
though, would pose problems for courts traditionally reluctant to
become too involved in corporate decision-making, a reluctance
already embodied in the longstanding business judgment rule.79
74. Id. at 584–85.
75. Id. at 591.
76. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J.,
dissenting)).
77. Id. I have found no case before Rogers using the term “gift in part” to
describe waste or ultra vires actions; its last Delaware use is in Saminsky v.
Abbott, 185 A.2d 765, 770 (Del. 1961) (applying waste doctrine to a common-law
business trust).
78. The Court cites earlier cases for this proposition, but those cases
involved self-dealing by corporate controllers. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d
109, 114 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J., dissenting) (citing Endicott v. Marvel, 87 A.
230 (N.J. Ch. 1913); Collins v. Hite, 153 S.E. 240 (W. Va. 1930)).
79. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law:
Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 412 n.33
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Compensation was, after all, rarely a pure gift.80 Would courts
actually venture to weigh corporate payments, at least those
lacking indicia of self-dealing, to determine when they were so
extravagant as to constitute gifts in part?
The answer, it became clear over the rest of the decade, was
no. After Rogers, a series of cases would challenge executive
compensation as violating the rule handed down in Rogers, but in
not a single one did plaintiffs win.81 Courts’ hesitant approach
was summed in a 1939 case, McQuillen v National Cash Register
Co.,82 where the court made clear that it would not second-guess
pay merely because it appeared high: “We must distinguish
between compensation that is actually wasteful, and that which
is merely excessive. The former is unlawful, the latter is not.”83
Waste only existed, according to the court, where there had been
“a failure to relate the amount of compensation to the needs of
the particular situation by any recognized business practices,
honestly, even though unwisely adopted—namely, the result of
bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices.”84
At least regarding executive compensation, waste already seemed
a dead letter.
A handful of cases asserting waste did succeed, but in these
the compensation at issue was payment for past services not
granted until after service was performed.85 In Fidanque v.
(2013) (noting the long history of the business judgment rule in Delaware).
80. Compensation payments awarded after services were rendered, such as
a bonus on retirement, were sometimes treated as gifts—payments made
without consideration. Infra note 81 and accompanying text.
81. Some cases would count as wins for plaintiffs because the investigation
into pay packages discovered other wrongs, such as overpayment of bonuses due
to miscalculations. One court, in examining a complex bonus plan at General
Motors, did state that it would have found that bonuses paid during the 1920s
were wasteful, had the claim not been time-barred. Winkelman v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
82. 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939).
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id.
85. On this rule, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 195–97
(1986) (citing Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221 (Ala. 1963), as a case involving a
minority shareholder successfully challenging payments that the corporation’s
board of directors ordered). There were also cases claiming waste that appeared,
on close inspection, to be about self-dealing. See, e.g., Cullen v. Governor Clinton
Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952) (holding salary paid to
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American Maracaibo Co.,86 the court found a consulting contract
for a retired officer to be waste because the payments were chiefly
for past services, holding “[t]he fact that the contract may
constitute a gift in part only does not help . . . since a totally
inadequate consideration would invoke the same principles of law
as the absence of any consideration.”87 On similar grounds, a few
courts held that pensions awarded to the widows of corporate
officers could also be wasteful. In Moore v. Keystone Macaroni
Manufacturing Co.,88 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a board’s decision to pay the widow of the
company’s founder and president $25,000 a year “in recognition of
the long and valued services rendered to [the] corporation . . . by
her deceased husband”89 was ultra vires and against the general
rule forbidding a corporation to “give away, dissipate, waste or
divert the corporate assets.”90
This advance and retreat in the 1930s would be the first in a
repeated pattern of ups and downs in waste’s career.91 First
would come a moment when there appeared to be the need for an
“equitable safety valve” allowing scrutiny of corporate acts not
obviously violative of the fiduciary duties, a moment in which
courts would invoke the waste doctrine and threaten to give it
broad application.92 Once this passed, though, courts would
controlling shareholder for hotel management, when management contract was
already in place, wasteful).
86. 92 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1952).
87. Id. at 321 (citing Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933)); accord Fogelson v.
Am. Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1948) (“A retirement plan which
provides a very large pension to an officer who has served to within one year of
the retirement age without any expectation of receiving a pension, would seem
analogous to a gift or bonus.”).
88. 87 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1952).
89. Id. at 297.
90. Id. at 298 (citing 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 667–68 (perm. ed.)); accord Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221, 224
(Ala. 1963) (finding payment to widow ultra vires).
91. A point made in Thomas & Wells, infra note 97, at 858 (“By one
estimate, executive compensation did not again attain the heights of the early
1930s until the end of the 1980s.”).
92. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895 (Del. Ch.
1999) (“Although I recognize that our law has long afforded plaintiffs the
vestigial right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed,
uncoerced independent stockholders approved by a non-unanimous vote was
wasteful, I question the continued utility of this ‘equitable safety valve.’”).
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retreat from waste and return to their general deference to the
business decisions of unconflicted directors as embodied in the
business judgment rule.93 Waste would never disappear, but it
would only rarely gain any traction.94 We can see this in the
1950s challenges to stock option compensation, and in a related
area in challenges to mutual fund fees.95 It is also this time when
we see Delaware law become central to the development of the
waste doctrine.96
The stock option cases are probably better known.97 In 1950,
changes in tax law made it easier for corporations to award stock
options grants as compensation.98 Such “restricted stock option
grants” would become popular for executives as they were often
taxed at rates lower than the then-sky-high marginal income tax
rates.99 Yet options grants were worrisome; they were hard to
value (pre Black-Scholes) and threatened to allow managers to
transfer ownership to themselves, a longstanding fear of
reformers.100 In 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two
major cases asserting such grants were waste: Gottlieb v. Heyden
93. See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 160–61 (rev. ed.
1946) [hereinafter BALLANTINE 1946] (“Courts will not, in general, undertake to
review the expediency of contracts or other business transactions authorized by
their directors. . . . But it is presumed in this ‘business judgment rule’ that
reasonable diligence and care have been exercised.”).
94. See Thomas & Wells, infra note 97, at 857 (“Executive compensation
faded as an issue at the end of the 1930s.”).
95. See id. at 868–69 (“During the 1950s, the prevalent issue concerning
executive compensation in the Delaware courts was the validity of corporate
stock option grants.”).
96. Rogers v. Hill was a U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting New Jersey
law, but was “long incorporated in Delaware law.” 1 R. FRANKLIN BALLOTTI &
JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS § 4.11 (2d ed. Supp. 1992).
97. My discussion of the stock option cases draws on Randall S. Thomas &
Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal
Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 868–73
(2011). Delaware law had allowed stock options since at least 1929, but their
widespread popularity was new to the 1950s. See Grimes v. Alteon, 804 A.2d
256, 263–64 (Del. 2002) (“The predecessor provision to Section 157 was first
passed in 1929, the first statute in the nation expressly to authorize the
issuance of options.”).
98. For a discussion of this tax change, see Steven Bank, Brian Cheffins &
Harwell Wells, Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 J. CORP. L. 59, 77 (2016).
99. See id.
100. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 66, at 180–85.
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Chemical Corp.,101 and Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways.102
The claims in the two cases were identical: that the options were
given for no cognizable consideration and were therefore
equivalent to gifts.103
Waste allowed the courts to make a more searching
examination of this relatively novel form of compensation than
did traditional fiduciary duties; one observer even claimed that
such close scrutiny was “an un-Delaware-like approach.”104 What
professedly worried the court in these cases was the possibility
that the grants would be given for little consideration, or be
structured so that the corporation never received the promised
consideration at all.105 To avoid either possibility, in Kerbs the
court handed down a two-part test for option grants—a test
arguably more demanding than the traditional test for waste.106
The court held, first, that there needed to be “a reasonable
relationship between the value of the services to be rendered by
the employee and the value of the options granted,” which echoed
the basic test for waste and would prevent the options being
exchanged for a peppercorn.107 Second, the court required that
101. 90 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1952).
102. 90 A.2d 652, 656–58 (Del. 1952).
103. In both cases the plans were adopted by boards whose members might
receive the options, but were subsequently ratified by shareholders, which
would have the effect of curing any taint of self-dealing “unless the action of the
directors constituted a gift of corporate assets to themselves or was ultra vires,
illegal, or fraudulent.” Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 655; see also Gottlieb, 90 A.2d at 665
(“Ratification by stockholders, indeed, is frequently decisive of controversies in
this field of law.”).
104. Harry G. Henn, Book Review, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 574, 576 (1964).
105. See Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 657
Sufficient consideration to the corporation may be, inter alia, the
retention of the services of an employee, or the gaining of the services
of a new employee, provided there is a reasonable relationship
between the value of the services to be rendered by the employee and
the value of the options granted as an inducement or compensation.
106. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“If, however,
there is any substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is
a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile,
there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex
post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.”).
107. Kerbs, 90 A.2d. at 656; see also Haft v. Dart Group Corp., Civ. A. No.
13736, 1994 WL 643185, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1994) (“The legal test of
corporate waste is more demanding than a peppercorn standard . . . .”).
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there be “circumstance which may reasonably be regarded as
sufficient to insure that the corporation will receive that which it
desires to obtain by granting the options.”108 Because under the
plan challenged in Kerbs an employee could, theoretically, receive
the options, quit, and immediately exercise them, the court held
that the option grants did not meet its test—they did not ensure
that the airline would receive the employees’ services it had
bargained for.109 Note that this test was applied ex ante; the
possibility that an employee could take the options and run
rendered them waste, even if in fact the employee stayed at the
firm.110
Yet having invoked waste to make its point, the court then
avoided repeating the exercise in subsequent cases. This was in
part due to statutory change; Delaware’s legislature amended its
corporation law in 1953 to make clear that a board’s judgment
concerning consideration for options would be conclusive “absent
fraud.”111 More consequentially, when a stock option case again
reached the Delaware Supreme Court, in 1960’s Beard v.
Elster,112 the court weakened the rule adopted in Kerbs.113 While
reciting that the rule remained unchanged, the court
distinguished Kerbs from Beard by noting that in the former case,
the options had been granted by a self-interested board and only
later ratified by shareholders.114 In Beard, in contrast, approval
108. Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 657 (Del. 1952).
109. Id. The court in handing down this rule cited Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit
Corp., a case of gross self-dealing where the controlling stockholder of a
corporation awarded himself a large in the money options grant. 60 A.2d 106,
109 (Del. Ch. 1948).
110. In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., a similar options plan was
considered, but the case was remanded to Chancery to determine whether there
was “consideration which has a value reasonably related to the concessions
made by the corporation.” 90 A.2d 660, 666 (Del. 1952).
111. See 2 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & HENRY V. ROTHSCHILD, 2ND,
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 569, 578–79 & n.43 (3d ed. 1962).
112. 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960).
113. See id. at 737 (“It is true that Kerbs and Gottlieb lay down a
fundamental rule governing all stock option plans, however adopted.” (emphasis
added)).
114. See id. at 737–39 (“[I]n the Kerbs case, the fact that the Directors who
voted in favor of the plan were permitted by the plan to leave the company’s
employ . . . impaled the plan upon the prong of failure to provide reasonable
safeguards that the corporation would receive the contemplated benefit . . . .”).
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had been given by disinterested directors and then ratified by
shareholders; in such a situation, the court concluded, the
business judgment rule would be appropriate, and a court would
be “precluded from substituting [its] uninformed opinion for that
of experienced business managers . . . who have no personal
interest in the outcome.”115
Waste’s limited utility was made plain as well in challenges
to compensation in mutual funds. After suffering a collapse in the
1930s, the mutual fund industry made a comeback following
World War II as cautious investors saw mutual funds as a way to
participate in the stock market.116 Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940—which reconstituted the industry—mutual
funds had an unusual managerial structure: each fund was a
separate investment company with its own board, which
contracted with an adviser to actually run the fund; the structure
was intended to prevent advisers from simply looting
wholly-owned funds, as had allegedly occurred in the 1930s.117
The funds were in fact creatures of the adviser, however, creating
a thicket of conflicts. Many observers came to believe this allowed
advisers to pry “excessive” payments from supine, controlled
boards.118
115. Id. at 738. For a retrospective on Delaware’s changing approach to
stock options, see Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“In
Beard v. Elster . . . the Delaware Supreme Court relaxed slightly the general
formulation of Kerbs et al., and rejected the reading of Kerbs to the effect that
the corporation had to have (or insure receipt of) legally cognizable
consideration in order to make an option grant valid.” (quotation at 337)).
116. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE
222–31 (3d ed. 2003) (“After the 1929 stock market crash, the reputation of the
investment companies declined even more rapidly than it had grown in the
previous three years.”).
117. See Alfred Jaretzki Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH.
U. L.Q. 303, 308–10 (1941) (“The original bill to regulate investment companies
followed in many respects the pattern of recent federal legislation.” (quotation at
308)); Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of
Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137, 137 (1961) (“The mutual fund sells its own
shares to the public. Governed by the investment decisions of its management
company, it then invests the proceeds in marketable securities.”). See generally
WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 29–49 (2016).
118. See COMM. ON INTERSTATE FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 12 (1966) (Conf. Rep.)
(“The courts have held that since the contracts under which the fees were paid
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In the 1950s and 1960s, almost fifty lawsuits were filed
alleging that payments to mutual fund advisers constituted
waste.119 The typical claim was that advisers did not adjust their
fees—usually 0.5% of assets under management—as funds grew,
even though economies of scale meant that expenses did not
increase at the same rate as did a fund’s size.120 Most of the
claims ended in minor settlements, but a few went to trial,
including what became the leading case, Saxe v Brady,121 a 1961
Delaware action. The plaintiffs lost, but the court did lay out
what became one of the classic definitions of waste:
[W]hether what the corporation has received is so inadequate
in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment
would deem it worth what the corporation has paid. If it can be
said that ordinary businessmen might differ on the sufficiency
of the terms, then the court must validate the transaction. 122

Under this approach, for a fee to be found wasteful, noted one
respected jurist, it would have to be not just “unreasonable,” but
“unreasonably unreasonable.”123 Strikingly, in the case of mutual
funds it was the very difficulty of satisfying this test for corporate
waste that eventually produced change.124 So useless was waste
as a limit to fees that in 1969 Congress amended the Investment
had been ratified by shareholders and by unaffiliated directors, the plaintiffs
had to bear the burden of proving affirmatively that the fees were so grossly
excessive that payment thereof constituted a waste of corporate asset.”).
119. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 at 83.
120. See Ben L. Fernandez, The Duties of Mutual Fund Independent
Trustees with Respect to the Investment Advisory Fee, BOS. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1997,
at 13 (1997) (“In connection with the analysis of economies of scale, the relevant
question is whether ‘the per unit cost of performing fund transactions increased
as the number of transactions increased.’”).
121. 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962).
122. Id. at 610.
123. Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 Before the S.
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 1015 (1967) (statement of Judge
Henry J. Friendly); see, e.g., Mark S. Vander Broek, Comment: The Demand
Requirement in Investment Company Act Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1500, 1504–05 (1983) (“The unaffiliated directors appeared unable to prevent
excessive advisory fees, and plaintiff shareholders seeking to attack the fees in
court were consistently defeated by the existing ICA standard that required
them to prove that payment of the fees amounted to ‘corporate waste.’”).
124. See id. at 1505 (“In an attempt to control excessive advisory fees,
Congress amended the ICA in 1970.”).
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Company Act to include a new Section 36(b) imposing fiduciary
duties on advisers in relation to fees—effectively taking the issue
away from state courts and state corporate law doctrine.125
Waste would be largely quiescent in the core areas of
corporate law for the next two decades. Before jumping ahead to
later developments, though, we turn briefly to examine waste’s
role in two other areas of corporate expenditures, charitable gifts
and political donations.
B. Charitable Gifts
Under ultra vires, gifts in general were forbidden, and the
classic example of such a forbidden gift was a gift to charity. 126 A
leading English case spoke the rule: “Charity has no business to
sit at boards of directors qua charity.”127 While there was a small
space for donations that promised to redound to the corporation’s
immediate or short-term benefit, such gifts were allowed
precisely because they were not true gifts.128 This rule was
125. See COMM. ON INTERSTATE FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 135 (1966) (Conf.
Rep.); SELIGMAN, supra note 116, at 378–80. Whatever hopes for it, in the end
Section 36(b) did no better for investors than did the waste doctrine. Lyman
Johnson, Protecting Mutual Fund Investors: An Inevitable Eclecticism, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (William Birdthistle & John Morley,
eds. 2016) (explaining that no investor has ever won a claim under Section
36(b)).
126. See FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 30, at 2148–49 (“[T]here is
no question but that an ordinary business corporation is without power to give
away part of its property” in the form of “a mere gift, such as a gift to charity”).
127. BALLANTINE 1946, supra note 93, at 228 (quoting Hutton v. West Cork
Ry. Co. [1883], 23 Ch. Div. 654, 673 (C.A.)).
128. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(indicating that “incidental humanitarian expenditures of corporate funds for
the benefit of the employees” would be allowable); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,
40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896) (“If that act is . . . lawful in itself, . . . is done
for the purpose of serving corporate ends, and is reasonably tributary to the
promotion of those ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote and fanciful,
sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers.”); see also Note,
Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 136, 136
(1931) (“Gifts by business corporations, organized for profit, are ordinarily ultra
vires. But donations are made with the expectation that pecuniary benefits to
the corporation will result.”).
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weakened in the 1930s as several states adopted statutes
specifically allowing corporate charitable donations without
requiring recognizable benefit to the corporation, probably in
response to immiseration and anti-corporate sentiment during
the Great Depression.129
Even with this change, though, charitable donations were not
automatically allowed, and fear lingered that such donations
would be found ultra vires.130 This was partially overcome in the
well-known 1953 case of A.P. Smith Manufacturing v. Barlow,131
where the New Jersey Supreme Court held a corporate charitable
donation to Princeton University intra vires under the common
law of corporations.132 The court reasoned that the donation,
while not providing immediate benefits to Smith Manufacturing,
would still eventually advance the interests of the company as
well as the community—a widely followed holding that allowed
corporate donations largely to occur without fear of ultra vires.133
Yet there was an important caveat; while the case apparently
rested on the common law, the court also looked to New Jersey’s
statute, which allowed only “reasonable” donations—defined as
129. See Note, Corporations—Charities—Statute Making Contributions to
Charity by Corporations Intra Vires, 52 HARV. L. REV. 538, 538–39 (1939)
(listing statutes adopted over the previous decade allowing corporate charitable
donations). See generally Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations to Charity, 4 BUS.
LAW. 28 (1948) (citing different surveys to give an idea of corporate donations to
charities at the time).
130. See Garrett, supra note 129, at 28 (“It was the traditional rule that a
donation of its property by a corporation not created for charitable purposes was
ultra vires and in violation of the rights of the stockholders.”).
131. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
132. See id. at 590 (“There is no suggestion that it was made
indiscriminately or to a pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of
personal rather than corporate ends.”). New Jersey did have a statute allowing
charitable donations, but the statute arguably did not apply to the company
here because it was passed long after the company’s incorporation. See id. (“We
find that it was a lawful exercise of the corporation’s implied and incidental
powers under common-law principles and that it came within the express
authority of the pertinent state legislation.”).
133. See id. (“[I]t was made to a preeminent institution of higher
learning . . . and was voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid
the public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private
corporation and as part of the community in which it operates.”). The court also
warned that donations could not be to “pet charities,” a signal that the duty of
loyalty would still apply to decisions to give charitable donations. Id.
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less than 5% of capital and surplus—to place a limit on the size of
a donation.134
How such a reasonableness limit was applied is shown in
1969’s Theodora Holding Corp. v Henderson,135 where the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a $528,000 charitable
donation.136 The grounds for the challenge were not entirely clear;
while the plaintiff claimed the donation was a violation of the
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duties, the court appeared to
ask whether the donation was ultra vires.137 After noting that
Delaware’s statute gave corporations power to make charitable
donations and, unlike New Jersey’s statute, put no limits on the
donation’s size, the court still concluded that “the test to be
applied in passing on the validity of a gift such . . . is that of
reasonableness” and pointed to federal tax law’s deduction
limitation of 5% of income as a measure of reasonableness.138 The
gift fell below this 5% limit, and the court also found this would
end up “benefiting plaintiff in the long run.”139 Twenty years later
in Kahn v Sullivan,140 Delaware’s Supreme Court would make
clear that Theodora dealt with a corporate waste claim when it
affirmed the approval of a settlement over another corporate
charitable donation: that of Occidental Petroleum for a museum
named after the firm’s founder, Armand Hammer.141 It held that
the test for waste—at least in the charitable context—was
Theodora’s test of reasonableness, with IRS provisions again “a
helpful guide.”142
134. See id. at 587 (“[T]he contribution shall not exceed [5]% [o]f capital and
surplus unless the excess is authorized by the stockholders at a regular or
special meeting.”).
135. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 1969).
136. Id. at 401.
137. See id. at 404–05 (inquiring into the reasonableness of the charitable
donation).
138. Id. at 405. The limit is now 10%. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“The
total deductions under subsection (a) for any taxable year (other than for
contributions to which subparagraph (B) or (C) applies) shall not exceed 10
percent of the taxpayer’s taxable income.”).
139. Theodora Holding, 257 A.2d at 405.
140. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
141. See id. at 63 (“In this case, we find that all of the Court of Chancery’s
factual findings of fact are supported by the record.”).
142. Id. at 61.
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In corporate charitable giving we see once more the strictures
of ultra vires transform into the weaker and more rarely invoked
ban on waste. Certainly, some of this is due to broadening views
of corporate purpose and a more capacious approach to how a
donation could eventually benefit a corporation. By the 1950s,
gifts were allowed not only for the corporation’s immediate
benefit but to benefit the free enterprise system in which
corporations flourished.143 Yet the shadow of corporate waste still
hangs over this jurisprudence, in the rule that charitable
donations be “reasonable” and the use of the IRS deductible limit
as a rough measure of that.144 Corporate decisions to give
charitable gifts still occur under a more watchful judicial eye
than do other corporate acts.
C. Political Donations
As with charitable gifts, there was little question at the
beginning of the twentieth century that corporate donations to
politicians and political campaigns were ultra vires.145 Whatever
143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (demonstrating a case where
a corporation made a charitable donation to Princeton University in order to
benefit the community).
144. The requirement that donations be “reasonable” is not to be found in
either Delaware’s corporate statute nor the Model Business Corporation Act.
145. See, e.g., Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 293 F. 208, 226 (M.D. Ala. 1923)
(finding contributions to political campaigns not a legitimate corporate expense);
McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904) (“The
donation to Louis S. McClure and to the Bimetallic Mining Company were
clearly outside of the purposes for which the corporation was created, both being
for strictly political purposes.”); see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”:
Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Laws, 92 GEO. L.J. 871,
915–17 (2004) (“The noted political reformer Perry Belmont contended that
corporate law held the promise of at least a partial remedy for owners of all
types of corporations offended by the use of their money for campaign
contributions.” (quotation at 915)); Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for
Crimes and Politics: Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth
Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1919–24 (2011) (“Courts considered corporate
political expenditures to be ultra vires before lawmakers outlawed political uses
of corporate funds.” (quotation at 1919)). Many states in the early twentieth
century also banned corporate political contributions through legislation. See id.
at 1923 (“[T]he wave of legislation reinforcing the ultra vires doctrine against
corporate political expenditures was also motivated by a perceived public
interest.”).
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a corporation’s specific purposes, advancing political causes was
not among them.146 When in 1906 it was discovered that the New
York Life Insurance Company had donated $50,000 to the
Republican National Committee, New York’s Court of Appeals
had no problem in holding that the company “had not the right,
under its law of existence, to agree to make contributions for
political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things
foreign to its charter.”147 A New York investigation of corruption
in the life insurance industry that year urged that the law be
changed so that “[n]ot only should [a political contribution] be
expressly prohibited and treated as a waste of corporate moneys,”
but any agent making a donation for a corporation should be
guilty of a misdemeanor.148 There was, as usual, a caveat to this
rule—some authorities suggested that a corporation could donate
funds to defeat a cause deemed “inimical to its interests”—but the
idea that corporations largely lacked the power to make political
donations undergirded many of the first campaign-finance laws
adopted early in the twentieth century, including the United
States’ first national campaign finance law, the Tillman Act.149
146. See Lipton, supra note 145, at 1919 (“The ultra vires nature of such
expenditures, however, did not derive from an abstract philosophy of corporate
personhood, but instead stemmed from the scope of corporate purpose
authorized by the shareholders.”).
147. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 387 (N.Y. 1907). The case
was actually about whether George W. Perkins, the New York Life executive
who arranged the donation, could be tried for larceny for taking the company’s
money and giving it to the committee; the court held in a divided opinion that he
could not, but only because he lacked the intent necessary to have committed
the crime. See id. (“The essential element of the ‘intent to deprive and defraud’
is nowhere to be found, and there is no just basis for the inference.”); see also
JOHN A. GARRATY, RIGHT-HAND MAN, THE LIFE OF GEORGE W. PERKINS 190–93
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).
148. Winkler, supra note 145, at 918 (quoting STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Assemb.
Doc. No. 41, 106 (1906)).
149. Id. at 916 (quoting ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 87–88 (1908)); see also Victor Brudney, Business
Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J.
235, 235 (1981) [hereinafter Brudney, Business Corporations] (“By the beginning
of this century, public pressure resulted in regulatory restrictions on corporate
political expenditures even if authority for such expenditures could be found
within corporate charters.”); Note, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70
YALE L.J. 821, 837 (1961) (providing an example of a typical state statute
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While most of the cases labeling political donations ultra
vires were from early in the twentieth century, this is another
area where the idea that some expenditures were ultra vires
lingered. Here too, however, as the belief that a corporation was
circumscribed by a limited purpose faded, so did the notion that
all political donations, irrespective of purpose, were ultra vires. In
Abrams v. Allen,150 a 1947 New York case, the court held that use
of corporate assets to promote an official’s personal views could
“state a cause of action for waste, mismanagement, lack of due
care, or conversion”;151 but in making these claims, plaintiffs were
careful to claim that the expenditures were not actuated by
“honest bona fide considerations affecting the welfare” of the
corporation.152 As states changed their legislation to allow some
corporate political expenditures, many still banned donations not
directly tied to the corporation’s business. The Massachusetts
campaign finance law eventually struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,153 for
example, only prohibited corporations from making expenditures
to influence a vote “other than [on] questions materially affecting
the property, business, or assets of the corporation.”154 In other
words, it was contributions that would return no benefit to the
corporation that the statute barred: those constituting waste. In a
1981 article reviewing the Court’s political speech jurisprudence,
Victor Brudney argued, in a section headed Ultra Vires Speech:
prohibiting corporations from contributing to political campaigns).
150. 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947).
151. Corporate Political Affairs Programs, supra note 149, at 844.
152. Abrams, 74 N.E.2d at 305; see also Corporate Political Affairs
Programs, supra note 149, at 824–27 (detailing corporate expenditures
promoting particular views). Some thirty years later, a similar claim also
appeared in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), where plaintiffs alleged a
corporation’s political donations were illegal and, thus, ultra vires under
Delaware law. Id. at 72 n.6 (“[T]here is not properly before us respondent’s
argument that the acts of a Delaware corporation violative of United States
criminal statutes are ultra vires acts under Delaware corporation law.”). Illegal
donations may also violate a director’s fiduciary duties, irrespective of whether
or not the corporation benefits. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.
1974) (“[E]ven though committed to benefit the corporation, illegal acts may
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty in New York.”).
153. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
154. Id. at 765.
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Waste, that the power remained for a state to ban certain kinds of
corporate speech by requiring unanimous shareholder approval of
the expenditure (as is required under classic doctrine for approval
of any wasteful expenditure).155
As corporate political donations became increasingly
regulated by state and federal legislation, waste claims against
corporate political expenditures tapered off, though they did not
disappear. During the 1990s, in Stern v. General Electric,156 the
plaintiff in a series of cases alleged that General Electric’s
donations to its political action committee were wasteful. The
claim was subsequently thrown out by a court operating under
New York’s distinctive definition of waste, which required bad
intent and that there be “a transaction no person of ordinary
sound business judgment” would have judged the corporation
received “fair benefit” for.157 Today, in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,158 scholars
are again quarrying the waste doctrine to see if it could provide
any limit on a corporation’s political expenditures.159
IV. Waste’s Work
A. Waste’s Frustrations
From the 1960s into the 1980s, waste as a doctrine was at a
low ebb.160 This is probably because executive compensation was
155. See Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 149, at 243–52 (“To
start with the least complicated configuration, let us assume that state common
law or statutory law forbids waste by corporate management, and that it defines
waste as expenditures from which the enterprise cannot reasonably be expected
to benefit.”).
156. 837 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
157. Id. at 76.
158. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
159. See, e.g., Leahy, Super PAC, supra note 11, at 290 (“As such, this article
undertakes a detailed inquiry into the theories—waste and self-dealing—that
these authors propose that shareholders could use to successfully challenge a
corporate political contribution.”); Nelson II, Post-Citizens United, supra note
11, at 144–45 (“Shareholders may file derivative claims of corporate waste
against directors of corporations to challenge corporate independent political
expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation.”).
160. This is not to say there were no cases asserting waste. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 74 (Del. Ch. 1969) (rejecting an assertion that a corporation’s
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not a significant issue for much of that period, and the line of
cases stemming from Rogers v. Hill161 was seen as chiefly
applying to executive compensation.162 When courts did address
compensation, they more often looked at the process used to set
it, not whether the resulting pay package constituted waste.163 It
was also at this time that statutory reforms swept away what
little was left of ultra vires. In 1950, the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) eliminated ultra vires claims except in
very limited circumstances, making plain what had already
occurred in judicial decisions.164 In 1967, Delaware followed suit
in the revised Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL),
“severely constrict[ing] the categories of claimants who [could]
raise the ultra vires defense.”165 These changes illuminate not
only the dwindling of ultra vires, but how waste had become
detached from its predecessor. By the end of the 1970s we begin
to see cases refer to acts that could be waste or ultra vires, a
distinction emphasizing the separation of the two.166 A prime
illustration of this divergence appeared when the American Law
Institute adopted its controversial Principles of Corporate
voluntary payment in lieu of taxes was waste).
161. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
162. See CLARK, supra note 85, at 197–99 (treating Rogers as solely a case
about executive compensation); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive
Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (1983)
(identifying the growing concerns of over-generous management compensation).
163. See Vagts, supra note 162, at 268 (“Rather than attack the
compensation problem head-on, the courts have focused on what was done
inside the corporations by the board of directors, by committees, and by the
shareholders.”).
164. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6 (1950); see also Whitney
Campbell, The Modern Business Corporation Act, 11 BUS. LAW. 98, 102 (1956)
(“[S]ection 6 of the model act . . . abolishes the . . . ultra-vires [doctrine], while
preserving the doctrine to a very limited degree.”).
165. 1 ERNEST L. FOLK, III, RODMAN WARD, JR. & EDWARD P. WELCH, FOLK ON
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW 2-21 to 2-24 (2015); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 124 (2017) (limiting ultra vires); Casanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., 65
A.3d 618, 648–54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (discussing Section 124 and ultra vires in
Delaware law).
166. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979) (noting that
voidable acts are those that are “performed in the interest of the corporation but
beyond” management authority, in contrast “from acts which are ultra
vires . . . or waste of corporate assets”). This is not to say that the link between
waste and ultra vires was completely forgotten, just that the two concepts were
increasingly not seen as the same thing. Id.
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Governance,167 which briefly discussed—and largely dismissed—
the “common law doctrine of ultra vires” in one section, while
devoting a separate section to waste in which ultra vires was not
mentioned—treating them as two separate concepts.168
Waste claims had at least one troublesome aspect, though,
that made the doctrine difficult to completely ignore: they could
be tough to get rid of, at least in Delaware—home of the majority
of the nation’s giant corporations. At first glance, they should not
have been. Waste claims were on their face implausible (a
transaction no rational business person would make, at least
absent fiduciary duty violations?), and no court after mid-century
found a transaction wasteful in a final judgment.169 But unlike
with some fiduciary duty claims, there was no straightforward
procedure to eliminate a waste claim—in particular, mere
majority ratification by shareholders did not immediately
extinguish a waste claim,170 a rule best explained as a survival of
the principle that void acts such as ultra vires could only be
ratified by unanimous shareholder vote.171
Nor was it always easy for courts to dismiss waste claims in
the early stages of litigation.172 Most notably, waste claims
survived summary judgment motions more often than one would
167. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
168. Compare id. § 2.01 (referencing the “common law doctrine of ultra
vires”), with id. § 1.42 (discussing “waste of corporate assets” with no reference
to ultra vires).
169. See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware
Judge’s Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 155 (2015) (stating corporate
waste as “an event never proved in any case I am aware of”).
170. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“In all
events, informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a
transaction in which corporate directors have a material conflict of interest has
the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review except on the basis
of waste.”).
171. The most sensible explanation for this rule is that unanimous
ratification is “akin to universal acquiescence by all possible stockholder
plaintiffs. The act remains void, but there is no one left to challenge it.” Laster,
supra note 33, at 1457 n.51.
172. It should be noted that the waste claims examined here were almost all
derivative, and survived motions to dismiss for lack of demand on the basis of
the second prong of Aronson v. Lewis, which requires plaintiffs to plead
particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the challenged
transactions were otherwise the product of a valid business judgment. 473 A.2d
805, 814–15 (Del. 1984).
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expect, in good part due to their fact-specific nature. According to
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1979’s Michelson v. Duncan,173
“[c]laims of gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to
disposition by summary judgment; and when there are genuine
issues of fact as to the existence of consideration, a full hearing is
required regardless of shareholder ratification.”174 It dated this
approach back to the stock option cases, which it believed
“indicate[d] a strong disfavor for summary judgment . . . where
waste of corporate assets [was] alleged.”175 In one later case, the
court quoted this passage from Michelson in justifying a refusal
to grant summary judgment, even while stating that the
“plaintiffs’ claim of waste [was] barely supported by the
record.”176 This is not to say that waste claims always survived
summary judgment, only that they did so more than one would
expect considering the stringency of the waste test.177 Later
empirical studies lend support to this conclusion.178
The ability of some waste claims to survive summary
judgment, while troublesome for defendants, may not have been
perceived by others as a problem at all. It has already been
suggested that one of waste’s functions was as a tool for courts to
authorize detailed inquiry into dubious corporate transactions
that were not, on their surface, blatant violations of fiduciary
duties. If that is the case, then the waste claims that survived
summary judgment were doing useful work, empowering
plaintiffs to investigate shady deals and, maybe, warning
corporate managers against particularly ill-thought or senseless
173. 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
174. Id. at 223 (citing Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952) and
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952)).
175. Id.
176. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982).
177. See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1,
1997) (“Although a determination of whether a payment constitutes waste is an
inherently factual inquiry which is difficult to determine on a summary
judgment motion, there are some cases in which a set of facts, if true, may be
said as a matter of law not to constitute waste.” (internal citations omitted)).
178. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 5, at 573–85 (documenting survival
of waste claims at some stages of litigation). The success of waste claims may
change over time; a later review found that, between 2000 and 2014, ten out of
fifty-two Delaware cases asserting waste survived summary judgment. Gass,
supra note 11, at 104.
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transactions. Be that as it may, by the 1990s Delaware’s courts
were criticizing the doctrine, perhaps because of a new wave of
litigation produced by rapidly rising executive compensation,179 or
because of the difficulty of harmonizing the waste doctrine with
Delaware’s fiduciary framework.180 Whatever the reason, by the
mid-1990s Delaware’s courts were expressing frustration with
waste’s persistence and even doubts about its existence.181
An initial burst of criticism came in 1995’s Steiner v.
Meyerson,182 where Chancellor Allen highlighted the bizarre
qualities of a waste claim in the course of a shareholder challenge
to executive compensation.183 Waste, he noted, is said to occur
when “a corporation is caused to effect a transaction on terms
that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment could
conclude represent a fair exchange,”184 or in the more extreme
phrasing of Saxe when there is a transaction so one-sided that no
person of ordinary, sound business judgment could even
“entertain the view that [it] represented a fair exchange.”185
Invoking the doctrine asked a court to pass on a transaction’s
fairness, contradicting the usual rule that “[a]bsent an allegation
of fraud or conflict of interest courts will not review the substance
of corporate contracts.”186 All this for a doctrine that was at best a
179. One source found that between July 1, 1989, and December 31, 1991,
Delaware’s Court of Chancery reviewed ninety-eight proposed settlements in
class or derivative litigation, one-third of which alleged excessive compensation
or corporate waste. Susan Lorde Martin, The Executive Compensation Problem,
98 DICK. L. REV. 237, 244 (1994).
180. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches
of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 117 (2004) (comparing the waste
doctrine to Delaware’s implementation of exculpation provisions).
181. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch.
July 19, 1995) (“The very high hurdle that a shareholder must overcome if he
seeks to impose liability on a theory of corporate waste is, thus, in fact a
protection of one of the basic utilities that the corporate form offers.”).
182. Id.
183. See id. (“This action challenges as corporate waste and breach of
fiduciary duty certain contractual arrangements through which Telxon
Corporation compensates its senior officers and its directors.”).
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
186. Id. at *5.
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“theoretical exception to [that] statement very rarely encountered
in the world of real transactions.”187 Lest one be in any doubt
about his view of the doctrine, he observed that “rarest of all—
and indeed, like Nessie possibly non-existent—would be the case
of disinterested business people making non-fraudulent deals
(non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!”188 In
sum, waste was not only an inconvenient doctrine; it might
describe only nonexistent transactions.
With newly voiced doubts about the existence of waste came
more restrictive approaches to it.189 In Lewis v. Vogelstein,190
decided two years after Meyerson, Chancellor Allen faced a
familiar claim: that stock option grants were wasteful.191 The
opinion restated the standard definition: “waste entails an
exchange
of
corporate
assets
for
consideration
so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any
reasonable person might be willing to trade,” typically a gift or
exchange that serves “no corporate purpose.”192 The court then,
187. Id.; see also Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (referring, apparently, to waste when discussing a “theoretical
exception” to the general rule that “in the absence of facts showing self-dealing
or improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally responsible to
the corporation for losses . . . as a result of a decision . . . in good faith”).
188. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July
19, 1995).
189. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387–88 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(concluding that a multimillion dollar stock option grant given a CEO eligible to
retire immediately was not waste).
190. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
191. See id. at 329 (“[I]t is asserted that the grants of options actually made
under the 1996 Plan did not offer reasonable assurance to the corporation that it
would receive adequate value in exchange for such grants, and that such grants
represent excessively large compensation for the directors . . . .”).
192. Id. at 336. Determining whether an expenditure was for “no corporate
purpose” raises intriguing theoretical questions in light of recent developments,
specifically the insistence in one recent decision that a corporate purpose must
be linked to promoting “the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
shareholders.” Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del.
Ch. 2010). In the few waste cases that address the question of whether an act
was for a “corporate purpose,” however, the questioned purpose is usually a
variant of self-dealing. See Chrysogelos v. London, No. 11910, 1992 WL 58516,
at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992) (allowing a waste claim to proceed when the
challenged expenditure was a share repurchase allegedly intended to entrench
the board). But see, Gorbow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (rejecting the
claim that “buying the silence of a dissident within management constitute[d]
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however, retreated from the approach set out in the 1950’s cases,
which promised special scrutiny for stock options.193 In Kerbs and
Gottlieb, the Chancellor concluded, the test applied had not been
a test for waste at all but instead a form of heightened scrutiny
no longer required:
In this age in which institutional shareholders have grown
strong and can more easily communicate . . . [shareholder
ratification is] a more rational means to monitor compensation
than judicial determinations of the ‘fairness’ or sufficiency of
consideration, which seems a useful technique principally to
those unfamiliar with the limitations of courts and their
litigation processes.194

Going forward, the test to be applied to ratified stock option plans
would be the “classic test” for waste “(i.e., no consideration; gift;
no person of ordinary prudence could possibly agree, etc.).”195
Having discarded the sweeping approach of the earlier stock
option cases, however, the court was still snared in precedent,
making it difficult to dismiss a waste claim.196 An “allegation[]
that an arm’s-length corporate transaction constitutes a waste of
assets . . . is inherently factual and not easily amenable to
determination on a motion to dismiss and indeed often not on a
motion for summary judgment.”197 The waste claim in Vogelstein
survived the motion to dismiss.198
The capstone to the Delaware courts’ increasingly skeptical
approach to waste was 1999’s Harbor Finance Partners v.

an invalid business purpose” and was therefore waste); see also Lyman Johnson
& David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22
(2014/2015) (noting that unless corporations are free to pursue non-pecuniary
ends, all corporate social responsibility is ultra vires).
193. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 337 (discussing that the stock option cases were
“very problematic”). Or so it claimed. See Lori B. Marino, Executive
Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to
the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1242–44 (1999) (providing a skeptical read of
Lewis’s reading of the 1950’s stock options cases).
194. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 338–39 (discussing the precedent of waste claims and its
analysis pursuant to “[t]he standard for determination of motions to dismiss”).
197. Id. at 339.
198. Id.
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Huizenga,199 in which stockholder plaintiffs challenged a
merger.200 Then Vice-Chancellor Strine’s opinion posed a
question, which must have occurred to many thoughtful
observers: why could a waste claim not be extinguished by
ratification from a majority of informed disinterested
shareholders?201 Shouldn’t such ratification by definition signal
that this was a transaction on which reasonable businesspersons
could differ, and so not meet the test for waste? While the rule
not permitting shareholder ratification was a “seemingly sensible
doctrine,” he wrote, its “actual application has no apparent
modern day utility . . . except as an opportunity for Delaware
courts to second-guess stockholders.”202 Transactions attacked as
waste in Delaware courts were typically “garden variety
transactions that may be validly accomplished by a Delaware
corporation if supported by sufficient consideration,” ranging
from stock option plans to corporate mergers.203 Waste did not, in
his account, protect stockholders where there had been
ratification.204 If “fully informed, uncoerced, independent
stockholders have approved the transaction, they have, it seems
to me, made the decision that the transaction is a ‘fair
exchange.’”205 In closing, while the opinion acknowledged that
there may be “valid reasons for [waste’s] continuation,” it called
for those reasons to be “articulated and weighed against the costs
the vestige imposes on stockholders and the judicial system.
Otherwise, inertia alone may perpetuate an outdated rule
fashioned in a very different time.”206 Though none of these cases
called for waste’s complete abolition, each expressed deep doubts
about waste as presently constituted. An observer in 1999 would
199. 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999).
200. See id. at 881 (“This matter involves a challenge to the acquisition of
AutoNation, Incorporated by Republic Industries, Inc.”).
201. See id. at 895 (stating that he questions the “continued utility” of such
extinguishment of a claim once it has been ratified by the shareholders).
202. Id. at 896–97.
203. Id. at 897.
204. See id. at 898 (stating that disinterested stockholders should be given
leeway with “little reason to leave the door open for a judicial reconsideration of
the matter” if they “are given the information necessary to decide”).
205. Id. at 901.
206. Id. at 902.
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have been entirely justified in assuming the doctrine was about to
be further marginalized. That observer would have been wrong.
B. Waste’s Uses
While waste came under fire in the 1990s, its utility in
corporate law had not completely disappeared, as shown by two of
the major cases in the following decade, In re Walt Disney
Company Derivative Litigation207 and In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation.208 The role it would play was
summed up in Sample v. Morgan,209 a case where shareholders
challenged a stock incentive plan that provided three corporate
insiders with a significant ownership stake in their firm in
exchange for $200.210 “When pled facts support an inference of
waste,” the opinion explained, “judicial nostrils smell something
fishy and full discovery into the background of the transaction is
permitted. In the end, most transactions that actually involve
waste are almost found to have been inspired by some form of
conflicting self-interest.”211 Waste “allows a plaintiff to pass go at
the complaint stage even when the motivations for a transaction
are unclear by pointing to economic terms so one-sided as to
create an inference that no person acting in good faith pursuit of
the corporation’s interests could have approved the terms.”212 The
opinion then articulated waste’s role as a safety valve allowing
further scrutiny of transactions that were not on their surface
fiduciary duty violations, but were inexplicable otherwise.213
207. 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
208. See 964 A.2d 106, 112 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The motion to dismiss is denied
as to the claim in Count III for waste . . . .”).
209. 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007).
210. See id. at 650–53 (“[G]iving away nearly a third of the voting and cash
flow rights of [the] company . . . .” (quotation at 652)).
211. Id. at 670. Query whether this should read “almost always.” Accord In
re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 657 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating that
waste is a “rigorous test designed to smoke out shady, bad faith deals”); see also
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 128 (3d ed. 2015) (“[I]nquiry into the
rationality of a decision is a proxy for an inquiry into whether the decision was
tainted by self-interest”).
212. Sample, 914 A.2d at 670.
213. See id. at 669 (“[T]he doctrine of waste is a residual protection for
stockholders that polices the outer boundaries of the broad field of discretion
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Waste worked this way in Disney, where shareholders
challenged the Disney board’s decisions to hire, then fire, Michael
Ovitz as the firm’s number-two officer and to pay him generous
termination benefits ($130 million after roughly a year’s work).214
Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that the board could have
dismissed Ovitz for cause and paid him nothing upon
termination, therefore making the large payment he did receive a
gift.215 While the chancery court initially dismissed the claims,
the Delaware Supreme Court’s reversal (in part) of this decision
ultimately produced a bench trial in which, before Disney won, its
board’s decision to grant Ovitz’s compensation was raked over the
coals—providing a case study in how Delaware courts could,
when they chose, use waste as an opening for rigorous critique of
board decision-making procedures.216
Disney showed waste being used as a tool to enable
investigation and identify proper corporate procedures, but also
something more. In Disney and later Citigroup, waste also gave
courts a means to demonstrate publicly that they were aware of
and responsive to larger social and political developments. In the
case of Disney, the larger development was rising executive
compensation and calls for limits on it.217 Compensation became a
major issue in the 1990s, with the Federal Government
intervening to curb its growth in 1993 and threatening to do so
afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”).
214. Three decisions were important: The Delaware Supreme Court’s
affirming and reversing in part the Chancery’s dismissal of the initial charges,
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000); the subsequent trial court
decision, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 778 (Del. Ch.
2005); and the Supreme Court’s upholding of that decision, In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
215. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 265.
216. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1010–20 (showcasing Delaware
courts’ use of opinions to set corporate norms); see also Lyman Johnson,
Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints, Sinners, Apostles, and Epistles,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 851 (2009) (“Unlike the re-tellers of the biblical
gospel, however, the ‘apostles’ of corporate law—the elite corporate bar—
frequently screen out the moral tone when writing their ‘epistles’ about
Disney . . . .”).
217. See In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 56 (stating that the plaintiffs contend that
the compensation committee’s approval of Ovitz’s employee agreement resulted
in an “enormous payout,” upon which the committee did not have adequate
information regarding the “magnitude” of the amount it could be).
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for the rest of the decade.218 The Disney case allowed Delaware’s
courts to broadcast that they took high pay seriously, thereby
dissuading non-Delaware actors from taking further steps to
limit high compensation.219 Indeed, in 2002, after the first Disney
Supreme Court decision and about the time that the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act220 was passed—significantly impinging on state
corporate law— two distinguished Delaware jurists wrote of the
need for Delaware courts to address executive compensation more
closely after many years of a “hands-off approach,” noting that
one way courts might police such compensation would be through
a “qualitatively more intense form of judicial review, through, for
example, a reinvigorated application of the concept of waste.”221
This did not come to pass, exactly—waste was not “reinvigorated”
after this case—but it helps explain why waste was deployed the
way it was in Disney. 222
Waste would play a similar role in the first major case
responding to the 2008 financial crisis: Citigroup.223 Citigroup
was not, initially, primarily a waste case; rather, plaintiffs’ main
claim was that Citigroup’s directors had ignored a series of “red
flags” in the lead-up to the crisis, thereby violating their
oversight duties as spelled out in In re Caremark International
Inc. Derivative Litigation.224 The court quickly disposed of the
218. Harwell Wells, U.S. Executive Compensation in Historical Perspective,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 41, 50–51 (Jennifer G. Hill &
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2012).
219. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 643
(2003) (describing rumblings that, after Sarbanes–Oxley, Delaware “could
attack excessive executive pay”).
220. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745,
750 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012)).
221. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1001 (2003).
222. See Roe, supra note 219, at 643 n.211 (discussing that the possible
decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney was either due to the
promulgation of Sarbanes–Oxley or “the state’s direct perception of the
underlying corporate problems”).
223. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
224. See id. at 121 (claiming that the financial markets displayed
“worsening conditions” that reflected Citigroup’s vulnerability to “exposure,”
and due to the director’s lack of oversight they were liable under the standard
set out in Caremark).
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oversight claims, concluding that there was no serious evidence
that the directors had disregarded their Caremark
responsibilities and that the claim was really a “straightforward
claim of breach of the fiduciary duty of care,” exculpated under
Citigroup’s charter.225 Yet tacked onto the oversight claim were a
series of waste claims, and one survived.226 In November 2007, as
the crisis hit, Citigroup’s board had agreed to provide retiring
CEO Charles Prince $68 million and fringe benefits in return for
which Prince would sign a non-compete agreement and certain
other agreements.227 The Chancellor concluded that the court was
provided little information about “the real value, if any, of the
various promises given by Prince” and that “[w]ithout more
information . . . there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the
letter agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’
standard or whether [it] awarded compensation that is beyond
the ‘outer limit’” of waste.228
Citigroup arguably fell within the older line of cases in which
courts more closely, scrutinized payments made to retiring
executives.229 It was perceived, however, as the product of a
“political zeitgeist” that had turned against major financial
institutions and their compensation practices that had done so
much to produce the crisis.230 Some speculated that the case
might herald “the beginning of a new era in Delaware business
jurisprudence.”231 One law firm advised clients that after
Citigroup, “extra care must be taken with respect to executive
compensation packages coinciding with decreasing corporate

225. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 128 n.65.
226. See id. at 140 (“Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to the claim
in Count III of the Complaint for waste . . . .”).
227. Id. at 139.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions
pursuant to payments for past services). But see Joseph W. Cooch, In re
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery
Court Scrutinizes Executive Compensation, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 169, 186–91
(2011) (providing an argument that Citigroup departed from earlier decisions).
230. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Keeping Current: Corporate
Compensation, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 22, 22 (stating that it was an
“unusual move from the traditionally pro-business Delaware courts”).
231. Id.
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success,”232 while another warned that “the Citigroup decision is
likely to leave open a window of opportunity for shareholders to
bring claims relating to executive compensation and severance
packages under the doctrine of corporate waste.”233
Both Disney and Citigroup made it possible to conclude that
the waste doctrine was being rejuvenated, and would be wielded
as it briefly had been in the 1930s, as a way for courts to cast a
harsh light on excessive pay and larger governance failures.
Standing by itself, Citigroup was an excellent illustration of the
potentially flexible application of waste and the ways that it could
focus attention and criticism on board decisions. Yet as the
financial crisis passed, the wheel turned again. Several later
cases alleging waste in the granting of executive compensation
were dismissed, and Citigroup was eventually dismissed “without
compensation to any plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney.”234 In
retrospect the case was an outlier. As in earlier iterations, a brief
period in which it appeared waste might be given expansive
application was followed by a retreat from the doctrine.
What role then does waste still have to play? One answer is
that it no longer has any distinctive role to play and that it is
already in the process of being folded into Delaware’s framework
of fiduciary duties as a subset of good faith.
V. Waste and Good Faith
Today, there is a strong trend towards treating waste as an
aspect of the fiduciary duty of good faith. A great deal has been
written about good faith over the last twenty years, so a brief
232. HERBERT F. KOZLOV ET AL., IN RE CITIGROUP: DELAWARE COURT OF
CHANCERY ALLOWS CLAIM FOR CORPORATE WASTE BASED ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION TO PROCEED, BUT DISMISSES ‘HINDSIGHT’ FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS,
REED SMITH 3 (2009), https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/217a3b7530a4-40d5-b38b-b6967113eaf8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/119c3ebf553c-4453-aa74-2359c58e4fa2/alert09077.pdf.
233. Delaware Chancery Court Revisits Oversight Liability and Corporate
Waste, DUANEMORRIS (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/alert
3190.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
234. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 278
(2014) (citing In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 3338-VCG, 2012
WL 628347 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2012)).
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summary will suffice.235 Some variant of “good faith” has been an
element of fiduciary duties since modern notions of directors’
duties began to take shape.236 Statements that fiduciary duties
included, or had to be carried out with, “good faith” were
commonplace a century ago.237 But good faith was more often
invoked than analyzed.238 It drew new attention starting with two
decisions in the 1990s. In the first, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor
Inc.,239 the Delaware Supreme Court announced that there was a
“triad” of fiduciary duties: loyalty, care, and good faith.240 This
unsettled earlier models of fiduciary duties and attracted
litigants who saw in good faith a way to avoid exculpatory clauses
by recasting gross negligence claims as claims of bad faith.241 In
the second case, In re Caremark, just three years after the
announcement of the “triad” of fiduciary duties it was suggested

235. For the most useful recent articles on good faith, see Joseph K. Leahy,
A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 859,
864 (2015) [hereinafter Leahy, A Decade After Disney]; Strine, Jr. et al., supra
note 10, at 634; Thompson, supra note 10, at 544.
236. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 633 (noting long history of “good
faith” in Delaware corporation law).
237. See MORAWETZ, supra note 39, at 483 (“It is manifest . . . that the
directors of a corporation occupy a position of the highest trust and confidence,
and that the utmost good faith is required in the exercise of the power conferred
upon them.”); see also Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) (“Directors of a
corporation are trustees for the stockholders, and their acts are governed by the
rules applicable to such a relation, which exact of them the utmost good faith
and fair dealing . . . .”); Vance v. Phx. Ins. Co., 72 Tenn. 385, 388 (1880)
(“Directors of a corporation undoubtedly occupy a fiduciary relation toward the
stockholders, and are bound to good faith and reasonable diligence in the
performance of their duties.”).
238. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006)
(“[T]he duty to act in good faith is, up to this point relatively uncharted.”).
239. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
240. Id. at 361.
241. See Strine, Jr. et al, supra note 10, at 631 (stating that since
Technicolor, plaintiffs could “subject the directors to damages liability even in
the absence of improper subjective motivation”). Gross negligence would
constitute a violation of the duty of care, and the typical corporation has
amended its charter to exculpate directors for monetary damages for violations
of that duty as allowed by DGCL section 102(b)(7), but that provision also
prohibits exculpating “acts or omissions not in good faith.” Id. at 696 (quoting
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)).
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that good faith was an aspect of the duty of care, further
confusing the existing fiduciary framework.242
The initial ambiguity surrounding good faith attracted
litigants seeking an “independent tool for courts to find liability
or enjoin activities that [did] not quite fit within established
doctrinal categories.”243 Good faith, then, was the latest candidate
for the role of judicial “fail-safe” played by waste and, more
briefly, “substantive due care.”244 In a series of decisions
beginning with Disney in 2006, however, Delaware courts
corralled good faith and placed it within the more familiar dyad
of fiduciary duties, holding it was an aspect of the duty of loyalty.
In Disney Delaware’s Supreme Court described acts not in good
faith245 as occupying the space between “disloyalty in the classic
sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or
of a related person to the interest of the corporation) [and] gross
negligence.”246 The concept covered conduct “which does not
involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively
more culpable than gross negligence.”247 In Stone ex rel v.
Ritter,248 decided later that year, the Court made explicit that
good faith fit squarely under the duty of loyalty.249 These and
later decisions, while shying away from providing a
comprehensive list of acts not in good faith, made clear that lack
of good faith would be found only in a situation where a director
had acted not just with gross negligence but with subjectively bad
242. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (“[T]he core element of any corporate law duty of care inquiry:
whether there was good faith effort . . . .”).
243. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (2005).
244. Thompson, supra note 10, at 545–46.
245. There was a brief scholarly debate about whether there were actions,
which were neither in good faith nor met the requirements for bad faith, but,
more recent work has argued convincingly that there is no middle ground—acts
are either in good faith or in bad faith. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra
note 235, at 898–99 (“[T]he no-man’s-land that Nowicki identifies—conduct that
is neither in good faith nor in bad faith—does not exist.”).
246. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
247. Id. at 66.
248. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
249. See id. at 369–70 (holding that good faith is a “‘subsidiary element,’ i.e.
a condition” of the duty of loyalty (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506
n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
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intent;250 such as “intentional dereliction of duty [or in] conscious
disregard of one’s responsibilities.”251 In a 2009 opinion, Lyondell
Chemical Co. v. Ryan,252 the Court further narrowed good faith,
holding, in a case dealing with a company’s sale, that only if
directors had “knowingly and completely failed to undertake their
responsibilities,” and had “utterly failed to attempt to obtain the
best sale price,” would they have not acted in good faith.253 After
its short day in the sun, good faith seemed to have lost any role as
a significant check on directorial action.254
The taming of good faith was part of a movement towards
simplifying fiduciary duties, in part by “rebifurcating” them—
restoring fiduciary duties to those of loyalty and care.255 That
impulse to simplify and rationalize the bases for directorial
liability has now reached waste, which in several recent cases has
been characterized as an aspect of good faith—more precisely,
waste has been taken as an indication of lack of good faith.256
This is a surprise, because the two are conceptually quite distinct.
The present-day test for waste is objective: waste is a transaction
so one-sided that no rational business person would enter into
it.257 One way of determining whether this has occurred is
whether in the transaction the corporation has received “any

250. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 689–90 (discussing Disney and
Ritter).
251. In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 64.
252. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009)
253. Id. at 243–44; see also Thompson, supra note 10, at 549–51 (discussing
Disney, Ritter, and Lyondell).
254. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 556 (discussing the disappearance of
the “potential for director liability based on good faith”).
255. See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate
Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2010) (“[M]any scholars and jurists [seek]
to return the law of fiduciary duties to greater simplicity.”).
256. As others have certainly noted. See Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith,
State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1153, 1154 n.103 (2006) (discussing that a waste
analysis is “really about the ‘good faith’ of the decisionmaker”). The survey
presented here to some extent, recapitulates earlier discussions. See Leahy,
Super PAC, supra note 11, at 308–11, and Kastler, supra note 11, at 1911–14 for
additional information.
257. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)).
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substantial consideration.”258 What is not usually asked is
whether those who authorized the transaction believed it to be a
good deal or not. A waste allegation may raise further questions
about the actor’s state of mind (may lead “judicial nostrils [to]
smell something fishy”),259 but the waste determination itself
should not rest on the mindset of the actor. The test of good faith,
in contrast, is clearly subjective—looking to the decision-maker’s
state of mind.260 And even when waste does point to a fiduciary
duty breach, there seems no reason to think it must always point
to a breach of good faith; one could imagine a wasteful
transaction that on closer examination was produced by gross
negligence, or was disguised self-dealing.
The history of waste and, before that, ultra vires, also point
away from equating waste and good faith. In the nineteenth
century, it was clear that ultra vires was a very different category
from the fiduciary duties. As noted above, whether an act was
ultra vires did not turn on the state of mind of the individuals
committing the act.261 It was possible furthermore to commit an
ultra vires act in good faith. Thompson on Corporations, for
instance, reported a case where, when “trustees of a religious
corporation, without authority, changed the securities in a trust
fund from those authorized by law to those unauthorized by law,
it was held that they were personally liable . . . no matter how
perfect the good faith with which they made the change.”262
Several modern cases observed a similar divide between good
faith and waste. In Gottlieb, for instance, the court apparently
accepted that the stock options at issue there were granted in
good faith, yet still remanded to the lower court to determine
whether the corporation had received consideration for them:
[h]onest directors conceivably might give away to their
associates in the enterprise substantial amounts of a
corporation’s property in the belief that the gift would produce
258. Id.
259. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 670 (Del. Ch. 2007).
260. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 633 (discussing good faith as the
“state of mind required of a loyal director”).
261. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text (discussing ultra vires).
262. See THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 28, at 300. There appears
to be an exception to this rule for directors who acted with all due care but were
mistaken as to their powers. Id. at 302.
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such gratitude that ultimately the corporation’s generosity
would be more than repaid. There would be nothing immoral
or dishonest about such an action, but it would not be legally
sound.263

Forty years later in Meyerson, Chancellor Allen would state that
“[t]he waste claim entails no claim of bad faith or conflict of
interest (if it did it would be a breach of fiduciary duty claim).”264
And, in several cases, notably both Disney opinions, the Delaware
Supreme Court analyzed plaintiffs’ waste claims separately from
those of breach of fiduciary duty.265
That said, there is to be found in older cases language linking
waste and fiduciary duties. In McQuillen, one of the earliest cases
addressing a waste claim, the court stated that waste had to be
the result of “bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to
[recognized business] practices.”266 In New York it appears to
have long been the rule that waste required a violation of
fiduciary duties, with a successful claim needing proof not only of
a wasteful transaction, but that “directors . . . acted with an
intent to serve some outside interest, regardless of the
consequence.”267
Several early Delaware cases also made this connection.
1993’s Emerald Partners v. Berlin,268 stated that in “a transaction
in which the corporation received no consideration . . .” a waste
claim—a section 102(b)(7) provision would not protect directors
because “they would have acted in bad faith.”269 More
263. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 1952).
264. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July
19, 1995).
265. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–75 (Del.
2006) (analyzing waste claims separately from fiduciary duty claims); Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259–66 (Del. 2000) (analyzing duty of care, waste, and
“substantive due care” claims).
266. McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Md.
1939).
267. Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
accord Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A]ctions of
corporate directors are subject to judicial review only upon a showing of fraud or
bad faith.”).
268. Civ. A. No. 9700, 1993 WL 545409, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1993).
269. Id. at *8. The question of whether waste could be exculpated under
section 102(b)(7) was unsettled for a time, with a few cases holding that an
exculpatory clause would protect a defendant director from a waste claim. See
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consequentially, in Vogelstein Chancellor Allen, who the year
before in Steiner had been clear that waste did not necessarily
entail bad faith,270 wrote a passage connecting the two:
Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the
range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade. . . . If, however, there is any substantial consideration
received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the
fact finder would conclude ex post that the transaction was
unreasonably risky.271

This injects a subjective element into at least one definition of
waste. Under this approach, while the complete absence of
consideration suffices to mark a disputed transaction as wasteful,
“any substantial” consideration will mean it’s not wasteful, so
long as an additional element is present: a good faith judgment
that the transaction was worthwhile.
The next few years saw several more cases in which waste
was tied to bad faith (or lack of good faith). Most often the
connection was that a wasteful transaction indicated that bad
faith might also be present—that the decision under attack was
“so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it
seem[ed] essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad
faith.”272 If waste signaled bad faith, then the reverse could also
Green v. Phillips, No. 14436, 1996 WL 342093, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1996)
(holding that a waste claim not bringing directors’ duty of loyalty and good faith
into question is covered by section 102(b)(7)). More recently, however, a court
has refused to dismiss a waste claim by reference to a section 102(b)(7) clause;
given the trend that conflates waste and good faith, this appears the better
approach. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., C.A. No. 10374–VCG, C.A.
No. 10408–VCG, 2015 WL 1753033, at *14 n.114 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015) (“This
Court has found that, doctrinally, waste is a subset of good faith under the
umbrella of the duty of loyalty (and thus is not protected by a Section 102(b)(7)
exculpation provision).”).
270. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch.
July 19, 1995) (“The waste claim entails no claim of bad faith . . .”).
271. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (internal
citations omitted).
272. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(quoting In re J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988)). Stevens does
not directly refer to waste, but rather speaks of a transaction so inadequate as
to bear “the badge of fraud.” Id. at 781 n.5.
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be true according to some decisions: the presence of good faith
showed that a transaction was not waste.273 That is one reading
to give to the above-quoted language of Vogelstein and it’s echoed
elsewhere.274
From here it has been a short step for Delaware courts to
merge waste and good faith—either by taking waste as
necessarily entailing an act of bad faith or by asserting that
waste simply is bad faith, in the process erasing waste’s
longstanding position outside the fiduciary duty framework. In
the Disney trial decision, the Chancellor wrote that “[t]he
Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing
waste is an act of bad faith.”275 This falls short of a direct holding,
but it shows the two doctrines’ overlap, as does an assertion in
Sample that waste was “sometimes misunderstood as being
founded on something other than a breach of fiduciary duty.”276 In
the years since these decisions, the link between waste and good
faith has only tightened. More than one Chancery opinion has
treated waste as essentially a signal of a breach of good faith. In
Hampshire Group Ltd. v. Kuttner,277 for example, the court stated
that the “waste test is just another way to examine whether a
fiduciary breach has been committed,”278 while in Cancan
Development, LLC v. Manno279 the court stated that waste is
“best understood as one means of establishing a breach of the
duty of loyalty's subsidiary element of good faith.”280 Most
recently some courts have directly equated the two. In a 2014
case, Xcell Energy and Coal Co., LLC v. Energy Investment
273. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336 (“[I]f there is a good faith judgment that in
the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of
waste . . . .”).
274. Or simply quoted, as in Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)
and In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL
139768, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003).
275. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch.
2005) (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553–55 (Del. 2001)).
276. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing Steiner v.
Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 44999 at *6 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)).
277. C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010).
278. Id. at *35.
279. C.A. No. 6429–VCL, 2015 WL 3400789, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2015).
280. Id. at *20. But see Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 786
(Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing waste as “a means of proving bad faith conduct”).
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Group, LLC,281 the Chancery Court described waste as a “species
of breach of fiduciary duty claim,”282 while a year later, in
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transport Authority v. Abbvie Inc,283
the Chancellor stated that waste is “a subset of good faith under
the umbrella of the duty of loyalty.”284 Not every case equates the
waste and good faith,285 but the trend to conflate the two is clear.
After an eighty-year run, waste’s existence as a freestanding
doctrine in corporate law may be reaching its end.
VI. Conclusion: Waste’s Future
Waste now occupies an uncertain place in Delaware
corporate law. Recent cases have increasingly tied waste to good
faith, a move which in turn lodges waste under the fiduciary duty
of loyalty. Connecting waste to good faith makes sense; as
discussed above, waste and good faith analyses have often played
similar roles in corporate law—borrowing from one recent
decision, each has been invoked as a “‘fiduciary out’ from the
business judgment rule, for situations where, even though there
is no indication of conflicted interest or lack of independence on
the part of directors, the nature of their action can in no way be
understood as in the corporate interest.”286 But if waste is no
more than a species of bad faith, then its invocation seemingly
adds little to good faith analysis, and one is left wondering what

281. C.A. No. 8652-VCN, 2014 WL 2964076, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014).
282. Id. at *9.
283. C.A. No. 10374–VCG, C.A. No. 10408–VCG, 2015 WL 1753033, at *1
(Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015).
284. Id. at *14 n.114. The opinion does hedge a bit on this, noting that “the
existence of an academic debate as to whether that issue is truly settled,” id.
(citing Kastler, supra note 11, at 1911–14, and Leahy, Super PAC, supra note
11, at 308–09), and treating plaintiffs’ claim of a breach of good faith separately
from their waste claim. Id. at 15–16.
285. In one recent case, for instance, the Chancery Court wrote that “bad
faith is similar to the much older fiduciary prohibition on waste, and like waste,
is a rara avis.” In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l Stockholders Litig., No. 9640–
VCG, 2016 WL 3044721, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2016). But note that the
decision also speaks of the “fiduciary prohibition on waste.” Id.
286. See In re Chelsea Therapeutics, 2016 WL 3044721, at *1 (discussing
good faith).
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justification remains for a separate doctrine of corporate waste at
all.
One argument for retaining waste as a separate doctrine is
that, historically and conceptually, waste and good faith are
simply not the same thing. As shown above, waste is an offshoot
of ultra vires, has long been treated as distinct from the fiduciary
duties, and is usually measured by an objective test.287
Good faith, in contrast, has always been tied to fiduciary
duties and, in its contemporary form, is measured subjectively, by
the fiduciary’s state of mind.288 Certainly, fiduciary duties have a
degree of flexibility to respond to unanticipated situations, and
the fiduciary categories have not been as fixed in the past as one
might expect,289 but placing waste under good faith would be
moving it from a conceptual space it has occupied for almost a
century—a space outside fiduciary duties—and inserting it into a
fiduciary framework it has not previously inhabited.
One could also object that, if waste were treated solely as an
aspect of the duty of loyalty, it would lose much of its power as an
equitable fail-safe—or safety valve, or fiduciary out (pick your
term). One of waste’s distinctive (and criticized) features has been
that
a
waste
claim
cannot
be
extinguished
by
less-than-unanimous shareholder ratification of the challenged
transaction.290 In this it differs from fiduciary claims, which in
many instances can be defanged or extinguished by majority but
non-unanimous shareholder approval.291 In Corwin v. KKR
Financial Holdings LLC,292 for example, the Delaware Supreme
287. Albeit with a subjective element at times. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699
A.2d
327,
336
(Del.
Ch.
1997)
(“If,
however,
there
is any
substantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there should
be no finding of waste . . . .”).
288. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 10, at 643 (“[A] director cannot act
loyally if she uses her corporate powers in bad faith to pursue improper ends.”).
289. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 79, at 413 (discussing the business
judgment rule and how both duties of care of loyalty were subsumed into it).
290. See supra notes 170–178 and accompanying text (discussing waste and
shareholder ratification).
291. Assuming the ratification meets such requirements as being
disinterested, uncoerced, and informed. See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga,
751 A.2d 879, 900 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing the parameters needed to invoke
the amelioration of fiduciary duty claims).
292. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
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Court held that when “a merger that is not subject to the entire
fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully
informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested shareholders,”
the transaction is protected by the business judgment rule and
the sole claim remaining to shareholders will be waste.293
Furthermore, in this situation the business judgment
presumption is apparently irrebuttable, leaving waste the only
possible option for shareholders.294 Other recent cases have also
indicated that Delaware courts are increasingly open to
mechanisms that mitigate or eliminate fiduciary duty claims
following majority, disinterested shareholder approval of the
challenged transaction.295 If waste claims are determined to be
fiduciary duty claims, then it seems logical that they too could be
vulnerable to a non-unanimous shareholder vote, leaving
dissenting shareholders with no claim at all. (The story may be
different when transactions have not received proper, or any,
shareholder ratification.)
This may however be less a loss than it seems. While courts
have not as yet held that a waste claim can be extinguished by
non-unanimous shareholder approval, recent decisions have
made clear just how dubious courts are of waste claims where
there has been disinterested shareholder ratification. In Singh v.
Attenborough,296 decided last year, Chief Justice Strine
293. Id. at 305–06. The Court stated that this was well-supported by
Delaware precedent and only thrown into doubt by some unclear language in
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009). See id. at 309 n.19. That
waste is the only claim left to shareholders was suggested in the Supreme Court
decision and made explicit in the lower court decision. See In re KKR Fin.
Holdings S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 990 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Having not alleged
waste, plaintiffs’ complaint here will be dismissed if they fail to rebut the
business judgment presumption.”).
294. See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (stating
that the waste exception is the only option left).
295. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645–46 (Del. 2014)
(adopting rule that the business judgment standard will be applied to controller
buyouts if certain conditions are met, including conditioning of the transaction
on approval of independent, empowered Special Committee and informed,
uncoerced approval by majority of minority shareholders); see also In re Volcano
Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737–38 (Del. Ch. 2016) (stating that the
business judgment standard will irrebuttably apply when an informed,
uncoerced majority of stockholders approve a merger offer under DGCL section
251(h) by accepting a tender offer).
296. 137 A.3d 151 (Del. 2016).
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hearkened back to Huizinga and his doubts about many waste
claims.297 “When the business judgment rule standard of review
is invoked because of a [shareholder] vote,” he stated, “dismissal
is typically the result. That is because the vestigial waste
exception has long had little real-world relevance, because it has
been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a
transaction that is wasteful.”298 While reducing waste to good
faith may eliminate its use in cases where there has been proper
shareholder approval, it may already be effectively useless in
such cases.
Whatever objections one might raise to merging waste into
good faith, there are also arguments to be made in favor of that
move. For one, waste claims have often hinted at fiduciary
violations; it has always been difficult to imagine cases of waste
where someone did not violate his or her fiduciary duties. A
transaction so irrational as to be wasteful, in other words, is also
one so irrational as to suggest that directors demonstrated “a
conscious disregard for [their] duties” in approving it.299 From
their inception, indeed, waste claims have often appeared to have
a fictive quality, with allegations of “irrationality” cloaking an
implication that the transaction benefitted the decision-maker.300
If waste claims have always carried with them a whiff of
fiduciary violations, then it may not be a radical leap to treat a
waste claim as really asserting a fiduciary breach.
Finally, it could be that waste has so outlived its origins that
it can no longer survive even as a vestige or anachronism. As this
Article has shown, waste grew out of ultra vires, and while it was
born after ultra vires had died, waste still developed in a milieu
where restrictive corporate statutes and charters were in living
297. See id. at 152 (discussing waste in reference to disinterested, uncoerced
shareholder votes).
298. Id. at 151–52 (citing Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879,
881–82, 901 (Del. Ch. 1999); accord In re Volcano Corp., 143 A.3d at 750
(“Because volcano’s fully informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders
approved the Merger . . . the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies.”
(internal citations omitted)).
299. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009).
300. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (challenging extremely
large bonus payments made to senior executives); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602,
610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (challenging large payments made to investment company’s
adviser).
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memory.301 It also developed when at least one of ultra vires’s
rules, that against corporate gifts, remained strong. Well before
the twenty-first century, however, that larger conceptual
framework had simply faded away. Corporation statutes today
are enabling and not restrictive,302 and corporations’ charters
typically empower them to engage in “any lawful act or activity”
for which a corporation may be organized.303 Waste, then, is
today—and probably has been for many years—a doctrine sui
generis, not rooted in any larger legal framework governing
managerial duties. If the original ground from which waste grew
has long since washed away, perhaps transplanting waste into
the duty of loyalty is a way to ensure that it will still flourish.
Such a move could even find support in the historical story
told here. While corporate waste as a distinctive doctrine was
developed in the 1930s, courts since the early American republic
have decried “waste” by corporate managers, and in early cases
that term was sometimes used to describe the result of a breach
of fiduciary duties.304 In Robinson v. Smith, the first American
shareholder derivative suit, the court handed down as a rule that
directors are “liable, if they suffer the corporate funds or property
to be lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the
duties of their trust.”305 Folding corporate waste into good faith
would, in this view, only be returning to the time when the word
“waste” described the result of directors’ “inattention to the duties
of their trust.”306
* * *
Corporate waste is already recognized as a vestige, an odd
survival from the first Gilded Age reworked and reworked again
across the twentieth century by courts and litigants who could
have cared less about its historical roots. Recently courts have
301. See supra Part III (“Waste’s Emergence.”).
302. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW, § 2.2,
56 (3d ed. 2011).
303. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (“Contents of certificate of
incorporation.”).
304. See supra Part III (looking at areas where waste was usually claimed—
compensation, gifts and political donations—and how waste was thought to be a
part of the fiduciary duty framework).
305. 3 Paige Ch. 222, 231 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
306. Id. at 222.
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increasingly treated waste as interchangeable with good faith,
and it may well be that we are witnessing the twilight of waste as
an independent doctrine. But waste, even if a vestige, is a vestige
that has from time to time proven useful, providing courts a
means to cast light onto decisions not always easily reachable by
more traditional fiduciary claims. Waste may not survive as an
independent doctrine, but one can hope that the role it played
will not be abandoned.

